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Mitya Karamazov Gives the
Supreme Court an Onion: The Role
of Confessions
by Amy D. Ronner"
I.

INTRODUCTION

In The Brothers Karamazov,' Grushenka tells Alyosha a fable that
she heard as a child:
Once upon a time there was a woman, and she was wicked as wicked
could be, and she died. And not one good deed was left behind her.
The devils took her and threw her into the lake of fire. And her
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FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV (Richard Pevear & Larissa

Volokhonsky trans., 1990) (1879-80).
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guardian angel stood thinking: what good deed of hers can I remember
to tell God? Then he remembered and said to God: once she pulled up
an onion and gave it to a beggar ....'
After the fable, Grushenka confesses that she herself is that very
"wicked woman," who, in her entire life, has "given just one little
onion."3 In Dostoevsky's novels, characters, like Grushenka, have a
propensity to self-incriminate. As J.M. Coetzee puts it, in Dostoevsky's
writings, "confession itself, with all its attendant psychological, moral,
epistemological and finally metaphysical problems, moves to the center
of the stage." In fact, Dostoevsky implies that the whole human race

2. Id. at 352. Grushenka's name is Agrafena Alexandrovna Svetlov [hereinafter
Grushenka]. Alexei Fyodorovich Karamazov [hereinafter Alyoshal is the brother of Ivan
Fyodorovich Karamazov [hereinafter Ivan], and half brother of Dmitri Fyodorovich
Karamazov [hereinafter Mityal. The father of all three men is Fyodor Pavlovich
Karamazov, who, according to rumor, is also the father of an illegitimate son, Pavel
Fyodorovich Smerdyakov [hereinafter Smerdyakov].
3. Id. at 352-53.
4. J.M. Coetzee, Confession and Double Thoughts: Tolstoy, Rousseau, Dostoevsky, 37
COMP. LIT. 193, 215 (1985). Coetzee explains that "itmay be fruitful to treat confession
in the major novels as, on the one hand, a form of masochism or a vice that Dostoevsky
finds typical of the age, or on the other as one of the generic forms yoked together to make
up the Dostoevskian novel." Id. at 216 (footnote omitted); see also MIKHAIL BAKHTIN,
PROBLEMS OF DOSTOEVSKY'S POETICS 227 (Carl Emerson trans., 1984) (discussing
Dostoevsky's Notes From Underground as a "confessional Ich-Erzdhlung"in which there
is "extreme and acute dialogization" and "literally not a single monologically firm,
undissociated word"); PETER BROOKS, TROUBLING CONFESSIONS 32 (2000) (describing "the

self-abasing and self-aggrandizing confessional speeches of Dostoevsky's Karamazov, or
Raskolnikov, or his Underground Man"); DEBORAH A. MARTINSEN, SURPRISED BY SHAME

92 (2003) (stating that "Dostoevsky's experiments in confession not only manifest his
lifelong polemic with Rousseau, they also express his lifelong interest in narrative form"
and that "[bloth lying and confession are rhetorics of identity" or "vehicles for selfpresentation"); Julian W. Connolly, Confession in The Brothers Karamazov, in DOSTOEVSKY'S BROTHERS KARAMAZOV: ART, CREATIVITY, AND SPIRITUALITY 13,13 (Predrag Cicovacki

& Maria Granik eds., 2010) (discussing"Dostoevsky's complex treatment of the confessional
experience in The BrothersKaramazov, exploring the ways in which confession can be both
used and abused by the novel's characters, and ultimately... determinling] what makes
an effective confession in the world of this novel"); Paul J. Contino, Zosima, Mikhail, And
ProsaicConfessional Dialogue in Dostoevsky's Brothers Karamazov, in 27.1 STUD. IN THE
NOVEL 63, 64 (1995) ("In each of [Dostoevsky's] major novels, [his] confessors-Sonia
Marmeladov in Crimeand Punishment, Prince Myshkin in The Idiot, Father Tikhon in The
Possessed, Alyosha Karamazov and Father Zosima-assist others when they are most
violently fractured and self-destructive. The splintered selves of these confessants is often
due to their overweening concern about the way they are being perceived by others.");
Vladimir K. Kantor, Confession and Theodicy in Dostoevsky's Oeuvre (The Reception of St.
Augustine), 50 Russ. STUD. PHIL. 10 (2012) (analyzing how Dostoevsky developed "[t]wo
classical problems of Christian philosophy-theodicy and confessional- ... into a new
literary-philosophical system unprecedented in nineteenth-century European culture");
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is blessed and cursed with a confessant gene. In three parts, this
Article, focusing on that blessed and cursed gene, discusses the novelist's
posthumous contribution to criminal justice.
Part II summarizes seminal United States Supreme Court confession
cases. The Court has a longstanding hate-love relationship with
confessions: while it believes that such evidence can valuably assist the
truth-finding process, it has at times questioned its reliability and
mistrusted coercive methods used for extraction. The Court's express
6
5
goal under the Due Process Clause and Miranda v. Arizona is to
ensure that confessions are the product of a free and rational choice.'
Although the Sixth Amendment 8 and accompanying case law explicitly
aim to protect the integrity of the adversarial process, freedom and
rationality also (but more subtly) undergird the reasoning.' When it
comes to confessions, the Court's modus operandi entails fixating on
externalities, formulating safeguards, and regulating conduct. The focus
tends to be on things peripheral to the confessant: typically relevant
factors include the conduct of state actors, coercive techniques, or
deliberate elicitation tactics.' °
When it comes to confession, Dostoevsky is worlds apart, and Part III
hones in on those striking differences. While the law's focus is on
external forces, Dostoevsky essentially relegates those forces to the
realm of irrelevance or at least sees them as least problematic. In his
fiction, confession, an elusive phenomenon of infinite variety, pertains
solely to the individual soul and psyche. For him, by its very nature,
confession is divorced from free will and rationality; there exists in all
Homo sapiens an inner-coercive drive to divulge a slew of true or false
secrets. Dostoevsky, moreover, pokes holes in the notion that confessions
can and should play a role in criminal prosecutions. For him, confession
can minister to only one process: it is an incipient step in an individual's
Robin Feuer Miller, Dostoevsky and Rousseau: The Morality of Confession Reconsidered,in
DOSTOEvsKY: NEW PERSPECTIVES 82, 82 (Robert L. Jackson ed., 1984) ("Confessions may

seek to provoke, titillate, or lie; the narrator may expose, disguise, justify, or lacerate
himself. But rarely does the confession consist of a simple, repentant declaration of
wrongdoing or moral weakness.").
5. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
6. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
7. See infra Parts II.A.1 & II.A.2 (discussing the Supreme Court's perspective on
confessions under the Due Process Clause and Miranda).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
9. See infra Part II.A.3 (discussing the Supreme Court perspective on confessions
under the Sixth Amendment).
10. See generally infra Part II.A (summarizing the Supreme Court's perspective on
confessions and its efforts to prevent coercive tactics and to implement remedies and
safeguards).
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spiritual evolution, and interrogators, judges, or juries simply have no
business meddling in that ineffability."
Any attempt to analyze all confessants in Dostoevsky's fiction is a
virtual impossibility and would require coverage in a multi-volume
treatise, one possibly rivaling Joseph Frank's unredacted biography. 2
This Article instead focuses on Mitya, one of the three Karamazov
brothers, who tropistically leans towards a confession that would
inexorably emerge without any poking or prodding on the part of legal
agents. 3
Part IV, the Conclusion-returning to this Article's origin-takes a
closer look at what will become Mitya's "onion" and ends with a
conjecture of what Dostoevsky (and Mitya) might say to the United
States Supreme Court and legal scholars who have long struggled to
make sense out of the senseless confession phenomenon.
II.

CONFESSION JURISPRUDENCE

According to the United States Supreme Court and some legal
scholars, a predominant law-enforcement goal is to obtain a free and
reliable confession to introduce into evidence in a criminal prosecution.'4 Here, an ever-evasive goal is to isolate what causes individuals
to admit to things they did or did not do. The Supreme Court has
proffered answers, but none of them would likely impress Dostoevsky.
A.

United States Supreme Court

In its longstanding effort to discover the causes of a coerced and
involuntary confession, the United States Supreme Court tends to indict
external forces, mostly consisting of law-enforcement tactics. This focus
is understandable in criminal procedure, which typically entails an
imbalance of power in the combat between the state-with its enormous
resources-and a vulnerable, relatively powerless, accused.
The
psychological wrangling between police and suspects in the interrogation

11.

See, e.g., infra notes 318-19 and accompanying text (discussing Mikhail's genuine

confession, which issues outside of the confines of the courthouse) and notes 353-61 and
accompanying text (discussing Mitya's dream in the wake of his confession).
12. JOsEPH FRANK, DOSTOEVSKY: A WRITER IN His TIME (Mary Petrusewicz ed., 2010)

(containing 2500 pages distilled from the five-volume biography, which examines the
author's life and the Russian historical, cultural, and ideological context); see generally
ROBIN FEUER MILLER, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV:

WORLDS OF THE NOVEL 30 (1992)

("[Vlirtually every work of fiction Dostoevsky wrote contains some grain of his fascination
with the act of confession.").
13. See supra note 2 (describing some of the main characters in The Brothers
Karamazov).

14. See infra Parts ILA & II.B.
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room is not just the hackneyed drama of news and media, but often the
substance of Due Process, Miranda v. Arizona, and Sixth Amendment
confession cases.
1. Due Process: Totality of Circumstances. The Supreme Court
initially relied on the Due Process Clause to ban the use of confessions
extracted by physical torture and later expanded this to prohibit
psychological coercion. 5 While the policies behind Due Process
decisions (and behind Miranda as well) are numerous and important,
here the discussion confines itself primarily to doctrinal tests. In the
Due Process calculus, the suspect's idiosyncrasies are relevant, but police
conduct and the interrogation environment dominate. The trilogy,
Ashcraft v. Tennessee,'" Spano v. New York, 17 and Colorado v. Connelly,'" illustrates the Supreme Court's preoccupation with coercion from
19
the outside, which typically manifests itself as interrogator tactics.
In Ashcraft, the defendant, charged with having hired a man to
2
murder his wife, was convicted as an accessory before the fact. "
Ashcraft argued that his alleged confession that was "extorted" from him
violated Due Process, and based on the totality of circumstances, the
Court agreed.2 ' Police officers kept Ashcraft in custody for thirty-six
hours without sleep or rest. Relays of experienced investigators and
lawyers questioned him practically without respite from Saturday

15.

See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[Nior shall any person... be deprived of life, liberty,

or property, without due process of law."); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 281 (1936)
(noting that police officers whipped the defendants, and one was even strung up in a mock

lynching and repeatedly choked); see also Wakat v. Harlib, 253 F.2d 59, 61-62 (7th Cir.

1958) (noting that the plaintiff was beaten by police, had multiple bruises and broken
bones, and spent days in the hospital); People v. Matlock, 336 P.2d 505, 511-12 (Cal. 1959)
(finding that the defendant was interrogated under sleep deprivation tactics and put on a
board when he became sleepy); Bruner v. People, 156 P.2d 111, 120-21 (Colo. 1945) (the
defendant was not allowed to eat for fifteen hours, deprived of the use of the toilet, and
held over two months); Kier v. State, 132 A.2d 494,496 (Md. 1957) (defendant was stripped
naked and police indicated that they would take skin and hair from his body); People v.
Portelli, 205 N.E.2d 857, 858 (N.Y. 1965) (suspect was beaten and tortured until he gave
an incriminating confession); see generally Steven Penney, Theories of Confession

Admissibility: A HistoricalView, 25 AM. J. CRlM.L. 309, 333 (1998) (discussing the Brown
line of
16.
17.
18.
19.

cases and judicial responses to such police interrogation).
322 U.S. 143 (1944).
360 U.S. 315 (1959).
479 U.S. 157 (1986).
See generally id.; Spano, 360 U.S. 315;Ashcraft, 322 U.S. 143.

20. 322 U.S. at 144-45.
21. Id. at 145, 154-55.
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evening until Monday morning. The record reflected that the reason the
officers worked in shifts was because they, exhausted, needed breaks.2
Similar facts existed in Spano, which involved a post indictment
confession and a first-degree murder conviction of a 25-year old Italian
immigrant. 3 While the Court noted that Spano had limited education
and was "emotionally unstable and maladjusted," what mattered most
were the tricks of experienced officers and prosecutors who spearheaded
the investigation.24 Questioning did not occur during regular business
hours, but began in early evening and ended about eight hours later.
Interrogators, persisting despite Spano's repeated refusals to answer on
the advice of his attorney, ignored his requests to contact retained
counsel. 5
On the Spano menu was deception: the interrogators instructed Bruno,
Spano's buddy, who was a "fledgling police officer," to falsely inform
Spano that his telephone call had caused him trouble, his job was in
jeopardy, and loss of his job would be disastrous to his three children,
his wife, and his unborn child.26 Spano ostensibly buckled under
pressure and lies.2 7 The Court, "considering all the facts in their postindictment setting," held that the "official pressure, fatigue and
sympathy falsely aroused" were the culprits that overcame Spano's free
will and made him talk.
Connelly, a post-Mirandadecision, is on a different footing and would
have most intrigued Dostoevsky.29 The case entrenches what the
Ashcraft and Spano decisions posit: what causes an involuntary and
unconstitutional confession is coercive conduct on the part of state
actors.3 ° Unlike the situation in Ashcraft and Spano, in Connelly it
was the defendant himself, "without any prompting," who courted police
contact.31 Connelly walked up to an officer, blurted out that he had
murdered someone, and said that he wanted to discuss it. When the

22. Id. at 149.
23. 360 U.S. at 316, 323.
24. Id. at 322-23 & n.3.
25. Id. at 322-23. In Spano, Justice Stewart (joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan)
relied on Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), invoked Sixth Amendment concerns, and
opined that the absence of counsel alone rendered the confession inadmissible. 360 U.S.
at 327 (Stewart, J., concurring); see also infra Part II.A.3 (discussing confessions in the

context of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel).
26. Spano, 360 U.S. at 317, 319, 323.
27. Id. at 319, 323.
28. Id. at 323.
29. See infra notes 311-13 and accompanying text (juxtaposing Connelly with Ivan's
courtroom testimony).
30. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 163-64.
31. Id. at 160.
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officer read him his Mirandarights, Connelly stated that he understood
them, but still needed to talk about the murder. After a detective
reiterated the rights, Connelly told him that he travelled a 32long way to
gave details.
come clean and, while in police headquarters,
The next day, during an interview with a public defender, Connelly
became disoriented and was sent to a state hospital for evaluation.
Connelly told the psychiatrist that he was listening to the "voice of God"
In the suppression hearing, the psychiatrist
when he confessed.'
testified that Connelly suffered from psychosis with auditory hallucinations that impaired his ability to make free and rational choices.'
The Supreme Court, at odds with the Colorado courts, concluded there
was no constitutional issue because no third party (state agent) made
Connelly confess.3 5 The Court found a lack of coercive or causal police
activity, which is the "necessary predicate to the finding that a
confession is not 'voluntary.' 36 Chief Justice Rehnquist, the opinion's
author, interpreted "the cases . .. over the 50 years since Brown v.
Mississippi [as focusing] upon the crucial element of police overreaching"
and wrote that while the defendant's mental state can be a "significant
37
factor in the 'voluntariness' calculus," it is not controlling. The Court
stressed that Connelly's "perception of coercion flowing from the 'voice
of God,' however important or significant such a perception may be in
other disciplines, is a matter to which the United States Constitution
does not speak."8 Dostoevsky, however, intrigued by that very "matter
to which the ...

32.

Constitution does not speak," finds importance and

Id.

33. Id. at 161.
34. Id. On the basis of the psychiatrist's testimony, the trial court found that

Connelly's initial statements and custodial confession were involuntary. Id. at 162. That

court relied on the decisions in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), and Culombe v.
Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961), and held that a confession is admissible only if it is a
product of the defendant's rational intellect and "free will." Connelly, 479 U.S. at 162. The

trial court suppressed the incriminating statements, even though the police had not done
anything improper or coercive. Also, the court believed that Connelly's mental illness

vitiated his putative waiver of the right to counsel and privilege against self-incrimination.

The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed that decision. Id.; see also People v. Connelly, 702
P.2d 722 (Colo. 1985).
35. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167.

36. Id.

37. Id. at 159, 163-64 (discussing Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936)).

38. Id. at 170-71. The Court determined that the Colorado Supreme Court had also

erred by holding the waiver of Miranda rights to be invalid. Id. at 169-70. The Court

faulted the state court for "importing into this area of constitutional law notions of 'free
will' that have no place there" and said that while "Mirandaprotects defendants against
government coercion leading them to surrender rights protected by the Fifth Amendment[,]

it goes no further than that." Id.
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significance in the "perception of coercion," in those whispers or howls
emanating from deep within psychic trenches.39 Further, Dostoevsky
would likely concur with the Connelly dissenters, especially with their
suspicion that Connelly's statements were unreliable, and also with their
view that the statements should not be used as evidence.4 °
2. Miranda:Coercion. The policies behind the landmark decision
Miranda v. Arizona used to be sacrosanct and are now effectually
discarded.4" With no intention of slighting them, the focus here is
primarily on the Mirandadoctrine itself and factors, which according to
the Supreme Court, can either force or help guard against unconstitutional self-incrimination. 2 In fact, because the Court has progressively
obliterated Miranda and revitalized the older Due Process approach,
actual coercion and the totality of the circumstances are now even more
relevant and determinative.43

39. Id. at 170-71; see also infra Part III (The Dostoevsky Confession).
40. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 183 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Brennan
pointed out that "the use of a mentally ill person's involuntary confession is antithetical
to the notion of fundamental fairness embodied in the Due Process Clause" and asserted
that "[mlinimum standards of due process should require that the trial court find
substantial indicia of reliability, on the basis of evidence extrinsic to the confession itself."
Id. at 174, 183; see also infra notes 311-13 and accompanying text (discussing the Connelly
dissent in the context of Ivan's breakdown on the witness stand).
41. In Miranda, the Court said that the decision "in no way creates a constitutional
straitjacket" and "encourage [d] Congress and the States to ... search for.., effective ways
of protecting [individual] rights." 384 U.S. at 467. Post Miranda, Congress enacted a
statute replacing it with the totality-of-the-circumstances approach of the due process era.
18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2012) (enacted in 1968); see Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428,
435 (2000). In Dickerson v. United States, the Supreme Court deemed Miranda a
constitutional decision, declined to overrule it, and invalidated the statute. 530 U.S. at
444. In spite of Dickerson, the Supreme Court has nullified Miranda. See id. at 437-38
(admitting that the court has "created several exceptions to Miranda's warnings
requirement and... [has] repeatedly referred to the Miranda warnings as 'prophylactic'
and 'not themselves rights protected by the Constitution (citation omitted) (quoting New
York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653 (1984), and Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444
(1974))); see also id. at 438 & n.2 (listing other cases in which the Court has diminished
Miranda'sconstitutional status); Yale Kamisar, Miranda'sReprieve, A.BA. J., June 2006,
at 48, 51 ("[Tihe Supreme Court has now-made it clear that what it reaffirmed in Dickerson
was not the Miranda doctrine as it burst onto the scene in 1966, but rather Mirandawith
all its post-Warren court exceptions frozen in time.").
42. See Miranda,384 U.S. at 498-99.
43. See supranote 41 (describing how the Supreme Court butchered Miranda);see also
infra notes 105-10 and accompanying text (discussing how the Supreme Court created a
plethora of Mirandaloopholes and repeatedly stated that to suppress a confession, it must
have been extracted in violation of the Due Process Clause); infra note 108 (describing how
the Court effectually eliminated Mirandaprotections in the prison).
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In Miranda,Chief Justice Warren, the decision's author, reasoned that
rules were necessary to protect a suspect's Fifth Amendment right to

remain silent from the inherently coercive pressures of custodial
interrogation." The Court saw that the cases before it all "share[d]
salient features-incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a policedominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statements
without full warnings of constitutional rights."" From there, the Court
reviewed intimidation techniques, beginning with physical brutality, as
in the New York incident in which "police brutally beat, kicked and
placed lighted cigarette butts on the back of a potential witness under
interrogation for the purpose of securing a statement incriminating a
third party."'
The Court, recognizing that coerciveness inherent in custody can be
mental as well as physical, worried about privacy imposing a "gap" in
47
our awareness of what actually happens in the interrogation chamber.
Consequently, a substantial portion of the Miranda opinion is devoted
to exposing interrogation tactics used, taught, and designed in police
manuals to undermine the suspect's right to remain silent."' The
popular practices included (and still include) the following: placing
suspects in isolation and unfamiliar surroundings; exhibiting an air of
confidence in their guilt; minimizing the gravity of the offense; and

44. 384 U.S. at 433, 457; see U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall any person ... be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself...
45. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445.
46. Id. at 446 (discussing People v. Portelli, 205 N.E.2d 857 (N.Y. 1965)); see also supra
notes 17-18 (giving examples of other cases involving physical torture).
47. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448.
48. Id. at 449-54 &n.9 (discussing the methods described in the manuals by Fred Inbau
and John Reid as "reflect[ing] their experiences and... the most effective psychological
stratagems to employ during interrogation"); see also BROOKS, supra note 4, at 13
(discussing the police interrogation manuals by Inbau, Reid, and Charles O'Hara, as "works
which at the time of Miranda had attained a circulation of over forty-four thousand copies
(and in their revised editions continue to be widely used)" and stating that "Itihe tactics
preached by these manuals are as chilling as one might imagine"); Yale Kamisar, Fred E.
Inbau: The Importance of Being Guilty, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 182, 183 (1977)
("Inbau taught criminal procedure and its constitutional dimensions-all the while he
yearned for, and fought for, the day when criminal procedure would have no (or at least
very few) constitutional dimensions."); Douglas Starr, The Interview: Do Police Interrogation Techniques Produce False Confessions?, NEW YORKER, Dec. 9, 2013, at 42, 44
(describing how "a postdoctoral fellow in psychology named Saul Kassin" read the Miranda
decision, found "that it repeatedly cites the Reid Technique manual as the most
authoritative source on American interrogation techniques" and after becoming "a leading
expert on false confessions... believes that the Reid Technique is inherently coercive");
see generally FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS
(2d ed. 1962).
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interrogating relentlessly to overwhelm them.49 The manuals also
urged performing a "Mutt and Jeff" charade where one officer acts
friendly and the other hostile, putting suspects in fraudulent lineups
where they are identified as the perpetrators, telling suspects that
silence indicates that they have something to hide, and advising them
to go it alone to spare themselves and their families the cost of
lawyers.5 °
The Court in Miranda acknowledged that such overbearing devices
could produce a confession that is not "involuntary" within the precise
meaning of the Due Process Clause.51 Nonetheless, the Court found
such "techniques" to be "menacing" and rife with "potentiality for
compulsion."52 The Court felt that even without use of such methods,
the "very fact" of custodial interrogation "exacts a heavy toll on
individual liberty and trades on the weakness" of suspects.5 3 The Court
believed that absent safeguards to dispel inherent compulsion, no
confession "can truly be the product of [a suspect's] free choice."54
The Court set forth a bright-line rule that a confession given during
custodial interrogation is inadmissible unless suspects, after receiving
specific warnings describing their rights, provide a "waiver ... made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently."55 Moreover, a police officer
must cease questioning whenever a suspect invokes the right to silence
or the right to counsel, even if waivers precede those invocations.5 s In
short, the Miranda mandate derives from the assumption that outside
forces can and do undermine the will to remain silent, and the hope is
that the imposition of a code of conduct on state actors will help ensure
that a confession is the result of the suspect's free will.57 As elaborated
below, for Dostoevsky, all of this is a pipe dream. For him, confessions-by their very nature-are involuntary, irrational, and not

49. See Starr, supra note 48, at 43 (explaining how the "standard Reid Technique
manual, first published in 1962 and now in its fifth edition," is still used in training today);
see also infra notes 101-09 and accompanying text (discussing how interrogators still

employ the very tactics that mandated the Miranda safeguards and now, since there are
so many loopholes, they can make those into new coercive tactics as well).
50. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 452-54 (describing "Mutt, the relentless investigator," and
Jeff, the "kindhearted man.... [who] disapproves of Mutt and his tactics... [but] can't
hold Mutt off for very long").
51. Id. at 457.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 455.
54. Id. at 458.
55. Id. at 444.
56. Id. at 473-74.
57. See id. at 498-99.
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infrequently unreliable, and impugn the underlying premise and recited
goal of Miranda.
Sixth Amendment: Deliberate Elicitation. The Sixth
3.
on
Amendment right to assistance of counsel is an independent restraint
58
The
evidence.
governmental efforts to obtain self-incriminating
59
doctrine emerged before Miranda, when, in Massiah v. United States,
the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment required exclusion
of trial statements that an already indicted defendant made to a
government agent. 60
While Miranda's objective is to block or mitigate undesirable effects
of pressure imposed on suspects during custodial interrogation, what
undergirds Massiah and similar cases is the commendable policy of
61
In Massiah, the
guarding the integrity of the adversarial system.
Court rejected the government's contention that Massiah, unlike Spano,
was not in custody or subjected to "official pressure" and instead founded
2
its decision on notions of fair play. Although not as expressly stated
in the Sixth Amendment as opposed to the Miranda context, there is
nevertheless an implicit hope that the Massiah doctrine will help
promote uncoerced and rational decision making by a defendant.
In Massiah, the Court reasoned "that a Constitution which guarantees
a defendant the aid of counsel at... a trial could surely vouchsafe no
less to an indicted defendant under interrogation by the police in a

58. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall...
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.").
59. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
60. Id. at 204 (relying on the concurrence in Spano, 360 U.S. at 327 (Stewart, J.,
concurring), the Supreme Court stressed the impropriety of police eliciting a confession
after a defendant had been indicted); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964)

(excluding the defendant's confession after repeated requests by the defendant to consult
with retained counsel were refused and after his attorney had actually been turned away

at the police station).
61. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977) (citing Powell, 287 U.S. at 57

(stating the right, "guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, is indispensable
to the fair administration of our adversary system of criminal justice" and "vital... at the
pretrial stage"); see generally AMY D. RONNER, LAW, LITERATURE, AND THERAPEUTIC

JURISPRUDENCE 104-08 (2010) (discussing policies behind the Sixth Amendment and

explaining that "while the government could indeed investigate a suspect's criminal

activities after the indictment, it could not fairly and constitutionally use unlawfully

obtained incriminating statements as evidence against him at his trial"); Yale Kamisar,

Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure, in
CRIMINAL JUSTICE INOUR TIME 1, 11-38 (A. Howard ed., 1965) (discussing policies behind
the Sixth Amendment as extended to pretrial practices).

62. 377 U.S. at 206.
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completely extrajudicial proceeding."6 3 The Sixth Amendment thus
does not just encompass the right to have an advocate at trial, it also
extends to pre-trial, recognizing that charged individuals will and should
engage in strategy with their counsel, which, of course, helps promote
adequate representation. 4 The theory is that if defendants relinquish
information to the prosecution while they have their attorney by their
side, it is more likely this will be by choice, after a reasoned weighing of
options. On the other hand, interrogation of a lone defendant in an
"extrajudicial proceeding" is more likely to result in reduced freedom and
a less rational decision.65
In Brewer v. Williams," a post-Massiah case, the Court clarified that
deliberate elicitation on the part of state actors violates the Sixth
Amendment.6 7 Brewer involved the murder of a child, Pamela Powers,
who vanished while attending an event at the YMCA in Des Moines,
Iowa. Williams, who had escaped from a mental hospital and resided at
the YMCA, was spotted absconding with a big bundle. After issuance of
an arrest warrant, Williams placed a long-distance call to a Des Moines
attorney, Henry McKnight, who advised Williams to turn himself in to
the Davenport police. Once Williams surrendered, was booked, and
given Miranda warnings, McKnight, again conferring with his client,
told him not to talk to Des Moines officers about Pamela Powers. The
police also gave their word that they would not question Williams on the
drive back to Des Moines.66
Post-arraignment, the judge again administered Miranda rights and
another lawyer, Kelly, warned Williams not to say anything until he
could consult with his Des Moines lawyer. When the detective and his
colleague arrived to pick up Williams, they met with Kelly and repeated
the Mirandawarnings. Kelly also reminded the detective that Williams
was not to be questioned about Pamela Powers until he had consulted

63. Id. at 204.
64. See generallyPowell, 287 U.S. 45. The Supreme Court, overturning the convictions
of nine uneducated African American youths accused of raping two white women, found
that the tardy appointments were unconstitutional because they deprived the defendants
of legal advice "during perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings against [them]
...from the time of their arraignment until the beginning of their trial, when consultation,

thoroughgoing investigation and preparation were vitally important." Id. at 57, 72.
65. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 204.
66.

430 U.S. 387 (1977).

67. Id. at 405-06; see also Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519 (2004) (upholding the
deliberate-elicitation standard in the Sixth Amendment area and finding that the absence
of "interrogation" does not foreclose a claim that statements should be suppressed).
68. Brewer, 387 U.S. at 390-91.
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with McKnight in Des Moines. 9 After sensing "some reservations" on
the part of the detective, Kelly "firmly stated that the agreement with
McKnight was to be carried out" and that there was to be no questioning.7° Moreover, Kelly's requests to accompany Williams in the police
car were rebuffed. 7 '
On the way to Des Moines, the detective, who knew that Williams had
mental problems and was deeply religious, delivered what has become
the notorious "Christian burial speech" in which he commented on the
bad weather, referred to the arduous task of finding the body, and
pressed that the child's parents deserved a proper "Christian burial" for
their little girl.7" In response, Williams gave incriminating information
and described the body's location.73
The Supreme Court, declining to review the asserted Miranda
violation, reversed the murder conviction solely on the basis of the
Massiah doctrine.74 The Court determined that the Sixth Amendment
attached at arraignment and that Williams had not intentionally
relinquished his right to counsel before the police "deliberately elicited"
admissions from him.75 With respect to the "Christian burial speech,"
the officers knew that two lawyers were representing Williams, and yet
"purposely sought ...

to obtain as much incriminating information as

7
possible" during his isolation in the police car." Further, the Court
found "no reasonable basis" for waiver of counsel because Williams had
both expressly and implicitly invoked this right repeatedly throughout
7
his interactions with law enforcement.

69. Id. at 391-92.
70. Id. at 392.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 392-93. The detective said,
And, since we will be going right past the area on the way into Des Moines, I feel
that we could stop and locate the body, that the parents of this little girl should
be entitled to a Christian burial for the little girl who was snatched away from
them on Christmas [Elve and murdered. And I feel we should stop and locate it
on the way in rather than waiting until morning and trying to come back out after
a snow storm and possibly not being able to find it at all.
Id. (alteration in original).
73. Id. at 393.
74. Id. at 400-01. In Massiah, the Supreme Court rejected the government's argument
that Massiah was not in custody or subjected to official pressure and instead based the
decision on basic notions of fair play. 377 U.S. at 206. The Court made it clear that
although the government could indeed pursue an investigation of the suspect's criminal
activities after the indictment, it could not fairly and constitutionally use "[his] own
incriminating statements" as evidence against him at his trial. Id. at 206-07.
75. Brewer, 430 U.S. at 398, 400, 404.
76. Id. at 399.
77. Id. at 405.
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In later decisions, like United States v. Henry78 and Kuhlmann v.
Wilson, 9 which strain to justify opposite results based on virtually
identical facts, the Court sought to further define "deliberate elicitation. " 80 Once again the key-having little to do with the confessant's
mindset (or even that of the elicitors)-is the manifested behavior of state
actors who interpose themselves between the accused and counsel in an
ongoing prosecution. The query is whether a reasonable person would
find it likely that the state's planned course of conduct would lead to the
elicitation of incriminating information from the formally charged
individual."s
In Henry, the Court applied Massiah to incriminating statements
made to a jailhouse snitch. s2 The Court found a violation of the
Massiah rule because the informant had engaged the defendant in
dialogue and "had developed a relationship of trust and confidence with
[the defendant] such that [the defendant] revealed incriminating
information."' The Court deemed reasonable the findings below that
the informant "deliberately used his position to secure incriminating
information" at a time when defendant's counsel was absent.'
Apparently, the informant did not question the defendant, but rather
just "stimulated" conversations. 5 The Court analogized this to the
Massiah situation because it was tantamount to "indirect and surreptitious interrogation [."

In the Court's eyes, the Henry informant

became too active and too deliberate.8 7
In Kuhlmann, with nearly identical facts and also involving incriminating statements made to a jailhouse informant, the Court reached the
opposite result-no Sixth Amendment violation." The defendant was

78. 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
79. 477 U.S. 436 (1986).
80. See, e.g., Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 457 ("The Court in Massiah adopted the reasoning
of the concurring opinions in Spano and held that, once a defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to counsel has attached, he is denied that right when federal agents 'deliberately
elicit' incriminating statements from him in the absence of his lawyer."); Henry, 447 U.S.
at 270 ("The question here is whether under the facts of this case a Government agent
'deliberately elicited' incriminating statements from Henry within the meaning of
Massiah.");see also Fellers, 540 U.S. at 524 (distinguishing Sixth Amendment "deliberate
elicitation" from Fifth Amendment interrogation).
81. Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 459; Henry, 447 U.S. at 270.
82. 447 U.S. at 265.
83. Id. at 269.
84. Id. at 270, 274-75.
85. Id. at 266, 273.
86. Id. at 273.
87. Id. at 274.
88. 477 U.S. at 459.
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arraigned and incarcerated with another prisoner, Lee, who agreed to
assist in the investigation. When the defendant began talking to Lee
about the robbery, reciting the same litany that he had given the police,
Lee said that it "didn't sound too good." Over the next few days, the
defendant tweaked his story. Then, after a visit from his brother, who
told him that family members were upset by the murder, the defendant
gave damning details.89
This time the Court, disagreeing with the conclusion below that the
prosecution violated the right to counsel, faulted the federal appellate
court for failing to accord the state court's findings the requisite
presumption of correctness. 90 In the Court's view, the federal appellate
court should have deferred to state court findings that purportedly
distinguish the circumstances sub judice from those in Henry: the police
in Kuhlmann already had "solid evidence" of the defendant's complicity
in the crime and that Lee obeyed instructions to listen to the 9"spontane1
ous" and "unsolicited" narrative without injecting questions.
In concurrence, Chief Justice Burger stressed that the case was
"clearly distinguishable" from Henry in that there was "a vast difference
a voice in the
between placing an 'ear' in the suspect's cell and placing
92 According to
record."
to
'ear'
the
for
cell to encourage conversation
Burger, the state court got it right when it found the informant to be an
'
For Dostoevsky, the
innocuously passive, non-deliberate "ear.
is a passive "ear" or
confession
a
of
question of whether some recipient
94 For him, most of
difference.
a
without
active "voice" is a distinction
us have a deliberate elicitor, imprisoned as a cellmate in our very souls
and psyches. He also knew that the informer or defendant's stories could
95
be fabricated, misinterpreted, or both.
Commentators
What makes suspects waive their Miranda rights and confess?
Numerous theories abound: for example, Stephen Schulhofer, blaming
loose lips on attitude, believes that "confessions are now mostly the
result of persuasion and the suspect's overconfidence, not of pressure and

B.

89. Id. at 439-40.
90. Id. at 459.
91. Id. at 460.
92. Id. at 461 (Burger, J., concurring).
93. Id.; see also Fellers, 540 U.S. at 524 (emphasizing that deliberate elicitation is not
equivalent to custodial interrogation within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment).
94. See Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 461.
95. See generally Welsh S. White, Interrogation Without Questions: Rhode Island v.
Innis and United States v. Henry, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1209 (1980) (discussing the difficulties
in assessing the credibility of the informer or defendant).
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fear," and that confessants tend to be cocksure of "their own ability to
talk their way out of trouble." 6 Professor Peter Arenella, rebutting
Schulhofer, asserts that "when the efficacy of the police confidence game
depends so heavily on police custodial control of the suspect in a very
hostile, threatening environment," it might be impossible to "distinguish
between persuasion and fear."97
Most commentators, siding with Arenella, blame the Supreme Court
and opine that the interrogation environment, along with condoned
police tactics, is the veritable culprit. 8 As Professors Daniel J.
Seidmann and Alex Stein explain, police still 'Interrogate virtually all
suspects in a hostile environment, subjecting them to physical and
psychological pressures designed to make the suspects' choices irrational."' Many suspects believe, and are made to believe, that silence

96. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and
Vanishingly Small Costs, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 500, 561-62 (1996).
97. Peter Arenella, Miranda Stories, 20 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLY 375, 385-86 (1997).
98. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (With Particular
Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEo. L.J. 1 (2011) (explaining that the exceptions to
Miranda are so numerous that Miranda has been overruled by stealth); Mark A. Godsey,
Reformulating the Miranda Warnings in Light of ContemporaryLaw and Understandings,
90 MINN. L. REV. 781, 789-90 (2006) (discussing the litany of cases that have retreated
from Miranda protections); Rinat Kitai-Sangero, Respecting the Privilege against SelfIncrimination:A Callfor ProvidingMiranda Warnings in Non-CustodialInterrogation,42
N.M. L. REV. 203, 204 (2012) (analyzing how "Miranda'sholding has been eroded over time
as courts have admitted evidence gained in the absence of the warnings"); Irene Merker
Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, A Modest Proposal for the Abolition of Custodial
Confessions, 68 N.C. L. REV. 69, 81-82 (1989) (explaining how the "Court has undercut the
[Miranda]decision, hollowing out its core while maintaining a pretext of viability," which
facilitates confessional evidence); Starr, supra note 48, at 42-44 (describing the basic Reid
& Associates training course, which teaches post-Mirandalaw enforcers how to effectively
extract a confession); Charles D. Weisselberg, MourningMiranda, 96 CALiF. L. REV. 1519,
1524 (2008) (concluding, after researching "police training materials, social science
literature and post-Miranda decisions," that "little is left of Miranda'svaunted safeguards
and what is left is not worth retaining"); Jonathan Witmer-Rich, Interrogationand the
Roberts Court, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1189, 1192 (2011) (discussing how commentators have
realized that "the Supreme Court... seems to be shaping interrogation law to facilitate
the admission of custodial confessions, by creating 'safe harbor' rules that are relatively
clear and simple for police to satisfy").
99. Daniel J. Seidmann & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent:A GameTheoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114 HARV. L. REV. 430, 450 (2001);
see also Richard A. Leo, et al., PromotingAccuracy in the Use of Confession Evidence: An
Argument for PretrialReliabilityAssessments to Prevent Wrongful Convictions, 85 TEMP.
L. REV. 759, 764 (2013) (discussing how "readily an innocent suspect can be induced to give
a false confession" or even "multiple false confessions"). Leo explains that "police
interrogators can 'contaminat'-i.e., leak or disclose nonpublic details to-an innocent
suspect," and the "contaminated suspect can be led to incorporate those nonpublic crime
details into his confession narrative." Id.
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°° Police still
spells guilt and can and will be used against them."
fruitfully wield promises, threats, and trickery in mimicry of the sort of
tactics that the court in Miranda condemned and felt warranted
prophylaxis. 10' In fact, Douglas Starr, who enrolled in the basic Reid
& Associates training course in effective interrogation techniques, points
people it trains get suspects to
out that "[tihe company says that the
10 2

confess eighty per cent of the time."

Self-incrimination occurs often in spite of Mirandaand other putative
protections, and legal critics offer multiple, intertwined reasons for
this.103 For one, Miranda warnings have not just moldered into
sonorous wallpaper, akin to elevator music, but just about any confession
Cognizant of
given in their wake can be admitted into evidence.'
the Miranda
through
drone
perfunctorily
do
and
can
this, interrogators
this is just
that
reality-namely,
become
has
what
script, thus imparting
0
Moreover,
nullities0'
mere
themselves
inane formality and the rights

100. See, e.g., Godsey, supranote 98, at 793 ("While many reasons certainly contribute
to the willingness of Mirandized suspects to talk to the police, a major factor undoubtedly
is that many suspects naturally believe, albeit incorrectly, that remaining silent will make
them 'look guilty' and will be used against them as evidence of guilt.").
101. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text (discussing the kind of techniques,
fleshed out in police manuals, which the Miranda Court condemned and felt necessitated
the implementation of safeguards).
102. Starr, supra note 48, at 42.
103. See generally Richard A. Leo, Questioningthe Relevance of Miranda in the Twentyfirst Century, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1000, 1003 (2001) ("[Dlespite the fourfold warnings,
suspects frequently waived their Miranda rights and chose, instead, to speak to their
interrogators."); see also Starr,supra note 48, at 45 ("Leo has reported that the Miranda
decision, which is supposed to shield suspects from involuntary confessions, generally does
").
not: more than eighty percent decline their Miranda rights ....
104. When Mirandawas issued, it aimed to supplement-not replace-the voluntariness
inquiry of the due process cases. See Edwin D. Driver, Confessions and the Social
Psychology of Coercion, 82 HARV. L. REv. 42, 60 (1968) ("The Mirandawarnings of course
do not directly affect the limits set by 'voluntariness' on permissible tactics, but merely add
several safeguards."). In today's practice, Miranda has replaced the due-process-inquiry:
that is, once an interrogator recites the Miranda buzz words, a trial court typically skips
the voluntariness inquiry and admits the evidence. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 435
(conceding that when police obey Miranda, there will rarely be a colorable claim that the
confession was compelled in violation of the Due Process Clause); see generally Leo, supra
note 103, at 1025 (explaining "that Mirandahas shifted the legal inquiry from whether the
confession was voluntarily given to whether the Miranda rights were voluntarily waived,"
and that "defendant[sl will rarely be able to make even 'a colorable argument that (their]
self-incriminating statement was compelled'"); Weisselberg, supra note 98, at 1523 ("[11t
turns out that following Miranda'shollow ritual often forecloses a searching inquiry into
the voluntariness of a statement.").
105. See generally Leo, supra note 103, at 1003 (explaining that there are many
theories with respect to why suspects waive their Miranda rights, including "the manner
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the Supreme Court has butchered Miranda to such an extent that the
prosecution can almost always secure a loophole to excuse compliance
with Miranda, except them from106 its dictates, or foist the evidentiary
fruit of a violation into the trial.
With respect to the exclusionary rule, it is practically defunct, and
today numerous confessions, true or false, come into evidence." 7 Also,
the Supreme Court has effectually handed police a fresh box of tricks,
including the interrogate-now-warn-later strategy, and the redundant
question-release-question-again game, which is now permissible (and
even implicitly encouraged) in the prisons.' 8 Such devices make

in which detectives delivern the... warnings,... the failure of suspects to understand the
meaning or significance of their... rights[,]" and the fact that "the tactics and techniques
of police interrogation" have not changed as a result of Miranda).
106. See supra note 98 (giving examples of legal commentary on the many exceptions
to Miranda);see also infra note 108 and accompanying text (examples of how the Court has
eviscerated the exclusionary rules); infra note 108 (explaining how the Supreme Court has
essentially deemed Miranda inapplicable to prisoners).
107. In many cases involving confessions, the exclusionary rule is inapplicable, limited,
or riddled through with exceptions. See, e.g., Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 589, 594
(2009) (holding incriminating statements given to a jailhouse informant in violation of the
Massiah doctrine were admissible to impeach the defendant's trial testimony); United
States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 644 (2004) (failing to give Miranda warnings does not
mandate suppression of the physical fruits of a suspect's unwarned but voluntary
statements); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 317-18 (1985) (holding that when police,
acting without bad faith, violate Miranda during an interrogation, a confession following
a subsequent proper interrogation is not the inadmissible fruit of the initial violation); Nix
v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 448 (1984) (holding that the fruits of self-incriminating
statements given in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel can be admitted at
trial if the government can show by a preponderance of the evidence that the evidence
would have inevitably been discovered through means completely independent of the
illegality); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 723-24 (1975) (holding that when a police officer
violated Miranda by interrogating the defendant after he received warnings and invoked
the right to counsel, the incriminating statements could be introduced at trial for
impeachment purposes); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-26 (1971) (incriminating
statements obtained without Miranda warnings were admissible on cross-examination to
show inconsistency between it and the defendant's trial testimony); Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 491 (1963) (holding where defendant had initially been arrested
without probable cause, his subsequent confession is attenuated from the illegality and can
come in as evidence).
108. See generally Elstad,and Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), which together
permit the admission of a confession made after a Miranda-defective confession as long as
the failure to warn was not done in bad faith and the second confession does not proceed
directly from the first. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 616-17; Elstad, 470 U.S. at 317-18. Recent
decisions have made Miranda virtually inapplicable to prisoners. For example, in
Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (2010), the Court held that where an inmate invokes
counsel and there is a fourteen day break in custody, incriminating statements made in a
second interrogation are admissible. Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 117. In Howes v. Fields, 132 S.
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suspects, especially those who are already incarcerated, feel as if
1 9
Dostoevsky,
invocation of Miranda rights is perilous and futile. "
understanding that confessions can be unreliable and also fail to
facilitate truth finding, maintained that such evidence has no place in
the justice system. 1 0
Now with DNA exoneration, scholars, officers in the criminal justice
system, and the public are cognizant of the staggering number of
1
wrongful convictions-many of which are based on false confessions. '
For this, experts blame outside forces, like coercion or deliberate
elicitation on the part of interrogators, who isolate and overwhelm an
Dostoevsky, knowing that nearly all
already terrified accused. 2
human beings have internalized their coercers, realizes that individuals,
at least on an unconscious level, are primed and eager to oust secrets

Ct. 1181 (2012), the Court held that an incarcerated individual is not always in custody
within the meaning of Miranda any time he or she is being interrogated. Fields, 132 S.
Ct. at 1192-93. Under Shatzer, when prisoners request counsel, the interrogator need only
ship them back to their cell and then, fourteen days later, start over without counsel
present. 559 U.S. at 111-12. Under Fields,interrogators can dispense with the Miranda
warnings altogether if they question an inmate in an average-sized, well-lit room, swing
open the door every now and then, refrain from physical restraint or direct threats, offer
food and water, and tell the inmate that he or she can return to the cell. 132 S. Ct. at
1193.
109. See supra note 107 (providing examples of the Miranda loopholes).
110. See generally infra Part III (The Dostoevsky Confession) and Part IV (Conclusion).
111. See generally Starr,supra note 48, at 42 ("Of the three hundred and eleven people
exonerated through post-conviction DNA testing, more than a quarter had given false
confessions-including those convicted in such notorious cases as the Central Park Five.").
Starr discusses the case of Darrel Parker, who "[aifter nine hours of interrogation, ...
broke down and confessed." Id. Although he "recanted the next day,... a jury found him
guilty of murder and sentenced him to life in prison." Id. In 1988, another man in the
Nebraska State Penitentiary confessed to the crime, after which Parker obtained a pardon
and later, when Parker was eighty years old, he received an award of damages from the
state. Id. at 49; see also Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False
Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891 (2004) (discussing how the
innocent are wrongfully convicted); Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions,
62 STAN. L. REV. 1051 (2010) (analyzing wrongful convictions); Leo et al., supra note 99,
at 764 (discussing the case of Bruce Godschalk, who falsely confessed to and was
wrongfully convicted of two rapes, and how "the law may fail to protect contaminated false
confessors against the fate of wrongful conviction and incarceration, despite the many...
safeguards of the American criminal justice system"); Barry Scheck & Peter Neufeld, DNA
and Innocence Scholarship,in WRONGFULLY CONVICTED 241 (Westervelt & Humphreys
eds., 2001); Steven Witmer-Rich, supra note 98, at 1237 (discussing the "trend of DNA
exonerations [of] convicts"); Homepage, Innocence Project, http'//www.innocenceproject.org
(last visited Aug. 24, 2014) (giving the ever rising number of DNA exonerations).
112. See supra notes 98-105 and accompanying text (discussing commentators and
cases addressing permissible interrogation tactics and the numerous Miranda loopholes).
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well before the elicitor or interrogator converges on the scene to shove
them under hot lights.
III.

THE DOSTOEVSKY CONFESSION

Jurisprudence does not have a monopoly on confession, a phenomenon
that for ages has fascinated multiple theologians, philosophers, and

artists. Dostoevsky, of course, knew of religious communities, like the
Roman Catholic Church, which institutionalized the ritual." 3

His

character, Fyodor Pavlovich Karamazov (Fyodor), the reviled buffoon in
The Brothers Karamazov, sputters his version of the history of the
Russian sacrament:
Confession is a great mystery before which I stand in awe and am
ready to bow down, and here suddenly everyone in the cell falls on his
knees and confesses out loud. Is it proper to confess out loud? The
Holy Fathers instituted whispered confession, only then is there any
114
mystery in it, and that has been so since olden times.

Not surprisingly, like just about all else, Fyodor has it ass-backwards:
for the first centuries of Christianity, confession was public, but by the
thirteenth century, it had transformed into a private act, one even

transpiring behind the grille of a confessional." 5

In old Russia,

sinners often confessed to the soil rather than to priests, but this too
underwent change." 6
Incidentally, some Slavic literature experts
consider Zosima, the esteemed elder in The Brothers Karamazov, who
worships mother earth and all holy creation, as an animistic, pantheis-

113. See BROOKS, supra note 4, at 90 ("Other religious traditions, including the Judaic,
have.., emphasized the avowal of sin to the deity, but the Roman Church institutionalized and ritualized the practice in ways that had a momentous cultural impact.").
114. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 88.
115. FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV 81 n.5 (Susan McReynolds Oddo
ed., Constance Garnett trans., 2d ed. 2011) ("Confession was public for the first centuries
of Christianity, so Fyodor Pavlovich has it wrong: private confession is the more recent
innovation."); see also Roger B. Anderson, Mythical Implications of Father Zosima's
Religious Teachings, in THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV, supra at 733, 733 (explaining that
Zosima "expresses a disturbing tendency, by Christian standards, to worship the earth and
all forms of creation as being endowed with holy meaning" and that the Russian critic, R.
Pletnev, aligns the monk with "anthropomorphism and pantheism" and "considers
Dostoevsky to be close to the Strigol'niki heresy, the old Russian practice of confessing to
the soil rather than to Christian priests"); BROOKS, supra note 4, at 90 (stating that with
respect to the Roman Catholic Church, there was "a change from an emphasis on public
penance, as a manifestation of one's sin and need for restoration to the Christian
community, to an emphasis on the verbal act and fact of confession itself, and the
corresponding speech act of absolution").
116. See Anderson, supra note 115.
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tic, Christian alloy, one who is atavistically suggestive of the old ritual
of bowing to breathe one's sins into the ears of Russian terra firma."'
During Dostoevsky's era, in Russian Orthodox tradition-with its
monasteries and elders, who were the spiritual guides-confession was
venerated; it also brought controversy. 18 In The Brothers Karamazov,
Dostoevsky, elaborating on the elder, "who takes your soul, your will into
his soul and into his will," explains that "[aill disciples accept an eternal
confession to the elder, and an indissoluble bond between the one who
binds and the one who is bound."" 9 The elders, feared as too powerful,
were initially met with persecution, and as their popularity amongst the
people grew, so did criticism, which primarily targeted confession:
[C]ommon people as well as the highest nobility flocked to the elders
of our monastery so that, prostrating before them, they could confess
to them their doubts, their sins, their sufferings, and ask for advice
and admonition. Seeing which, the opponents of the elders shouted,
among other accusations, that here the sacrament of confession was
being arbitrarily and frivolously degraded, although a disciple's or
layman's ceaseless confession of his soul to the elder is not at all
sacramental."' °
Dostoevsky's narrator alludes to these kinds of accusations in the
scandal in which Zosima's opportunistic enemies, capitalizing on the
stink emanating from the elder's corpse, "malicious [lyl whisper" that the
newly departed had "abused the sacrament of confession.""'
Dostoevsky was conversant with the theological and philosophical
debates of his day, along with the genre that includes the works of
ancient Christian Latin writer Saint Aurelius Augustinus and eighteenth-century French genius Jean-Jacque Rousseau, both of whom
authored Confessions.'2 2 Professor Robin Feuer Miller, noting this,

117. See id.; see also MILLER, supra note 12, at 31 ("Dostoevsky was one of the founders
of the pochvennichestvo movement. Thus, when his characters express the desire to kiss
the earth and water it with their tears, they are echoing a fundamental belief of their
creator.").
118. See DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 27-29.

119. Id. at 27-28.
120. Id. at 28-29.
121. Id. at 333; see also Anderson, supra note 115, at 735 ("The early decomposition of
the elder's body, of course, is testimony to many that Zosima had strayed far from the
regular teachings of the church, that the rapid corruption of his body revealed his spiritual
'corruption' while alive.").
122. See Letter from Fyodor Dostoevsky to Nikolay Strakhov (May 18, 1877) in HI
DOSTOEVSKY LETTERS 1868-1871, at 360 (David Lowe ed. & trans., 1990) [hereinafter H
LETTrRs] (discussing Rousseau and "the dream of recreating the world anew through
reason and knowledge (positivism)"); see generally MARTINSEN, supra note 4, at 92

694

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

sees Dostoevsky as straddling the fence: he "was both attracted and
repelled by the act of confession-attracted by its moments of rare and
precious authenticity, repelled by the many self-justificatory and
arrogant uses to which it could be put." 123 Unlike the Supreme Court
and legal commentators, who prescribe tests and rules, Dostoevsky,
humbled by what he knew was an impenetrable mystery, understood
that confession, with its jillion inducements and manifestations, could
not be tested, regulated, or explained. While in criminal procedure, the
exegesis and panacea focus on physical conditions and third-party
conduct, Dostoevsky looked elsewhere. He scoured the psychological,
spiritual, and metaphysical landscape to locate coercion in the recesses
of each soul and for him, moreover, confession tends to serve no purpose,
salutary or otherwise, in our courts of law.
Dostoevsky, himself once a suspect, convict, and resident in a Siberian
prison, who experienced firsthand interrogation and torture, of course,
1 24
disapproved of police overreaching and recoiled at false convictions. '
According to Professor Peter Brooks, Dostoevsky's characters demonstrate that "[gluilt can in any event always be produced to meet the
demand for confession, since there is always more than enough guilt to
go around, and its concealment can ...

be a powerful motive for

confession." 125 Brooks's theory, one in which Dostoevsky would
acquiesce, is that what compels confession are "inextricable layers of

("Dostoevsky's experiments in confession... manifest his lifelong polemic with Rousseau.");
MILLER, supra note 12, at 62 (explaining that "much of [Dostoevsky's] fiction can be read

as a veiled polemic with that archetypal master of the confessional genre, Jean-Jacques
Rousseau, author of Confessions (1781)"); Miller, supra note 4, at 83 (explaining that
"despite Dostoevsky's sustained critique-through parody and polemic-of Rousseau's
Confessions, he felt, throughout his entire career, a continued attraction to the confessional
mode and always had a predilection for first person narratives both in his short stories and
in his longer fiction"); Coetzee, supra note 4, at 195 (discussing "confessional fictions" in
Dostoevsky, which "consist for the greater part of representations of confessions of
abhorrent acts committed by their narrators" within the Augustine and Rousseau genre);
Kantor, supra note 4, at 10, 13 ("It is no coincidence that the Book of Job has been the
favorite book of St. Augustine (he wrote Notes on Job) and of Dostoevsky, who made
Dostoevsky was probably familiar with St. Augustine, for
frequent references to Job....
the blessed Augustine was recognized by Orthodoxy and Orthodox writers referred to
him.").
123. MILLER, supra note 12, at 30.
124. See FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, THE HOUSE OF THE DEAD 37 (David McDuff trans.,
2003) (1861) (describing a man wrongfully convicted of murdering his father so that he can
"get his hands on the inheritance"). In this autobiographical novel, the narrator,
commenting on the man wrongfully convicted of parricide, who "had suffered ten years of
penal servitude for no reason," says, "[n]o need to expatiate on the tragic profundity of this
case, on the young life ruined by such a dreadful accusation." Id. at 302-03.
125. BROOKS, supra note 4, at 21.
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shame, guilt, contempt, self-loathing, attempted propitiation, and
expiation."1 26 For Dostoevsky all people possess a confessant gene,
So many
replete with interminable, refractory, emotive layers.
Dostoevsky characters are self-driven to come clean, and one example is
Mitya in The BrothersKaramazov, who is compelled to purge himself of
agonizing shame.
Mitya's Confession: Purgationof Shame
Mitya Karamazov is consumed with unbearable shame, which he
struggles to hide and yet wants to flaunt for public reprobation. His fear
is that the beast, thrashing about in his own breast, will escape to
perform heinous deeds.127 He dreads loss of self-control with its
resultant public degradation, which counterintuitively makes Mitya
yearn to bring it on, get it over with, and disgrace himself before the
world. For Mitya, confession, his first step toward healing, is a way of
reigning in destructive impulses, connecting with other human beings,
and halting a self-perpetuating cycle of throbbing shame. In The
Brothers Karamazov, Dostoevsky tells readers that the legal system,
incapable of descrambling such a genuine, heartfelt process, is simply
foredoomed to get it wrong.12

A.

1. Confession to Alyosha. Mitya's tripartite confession to his half
brother, Alyosha, begins in the secret venue of a gazebo in a "completely
deserted garden" where his whisper becomes the shout, "I'm here in
secret, I'm guarding a secret."129 The preamble bares Mitya's confessant gene, his craving to reveal information and explore his own inner
struggle. 3 ° At first, Mitya procrastinates by quoting writers, like
nineteenth century Russian poet Nikolay Nekrasov and the German poet
Friedrich Schiller, which is suggestive of Mitya's desire to stretch it out

126. Id. at 6.
127. See VICTOR TERRAS, READING DOSTOEVSKY 113, 128 (1998) (speaking of the
subtext, intertext, and ambiguity in Brothers Karamazov and pointing out that "Fiodor

Pavlovich, old Adam, carries in his lustfulness the seed of the personalities of his three

sons: Ivan, whose passion is intellectual, Dmitry, whose passion is sensual, and Aliosha,
MILLER, supra note 12, at 29 ("It is a commonplace to
an allegory about spirit (Alyosha), mind (Ivan),
brothers
Karamazov
discover in the three
and body or heart (Mitya). But this classification becomes woefully inadequate and thin
once one takes more than a cursory glance at them.").
128. See infra Part III.B.
129. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 103; see also MILLER, supra note 12, at 22
(explaining that "Alyosha is the perfect repository for the confessions of his brothers and
would seem to have the makings of an ideal future 'elder").
130. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 103.

whose passion is spiritual"); but see
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and savor the onset of catharsis. 3 ' He even says, "Don't be in a hurry,
Alyosha .... There's no rush now."'32 He, ardently craving expulsion,
falsely vows, "I'm going to tell you everything. For I surely must tell at
least somebody" and then candidly brands himself "a babbler."133
In his preamble, this "babbler" gives Alyosha (and readers) a peek at
his internecine battle with this beast.' 3 He says, "I'm just a brute of
an officer who drinks cognac and goes whoring" who can "sink into the
deepest, the very deepest shame of depravity."'
He, "a Karamazov,"
both blasts and cherishes his inner devil, with its humiliating smirk:
[Wihen I fall into the abyss, I go straight into it, head down and heels
up, and I'm even pleased that I'm falling in just such a humiliating
position, and for me I find it beautiful. And so in that very shame I
suddenly begin a hymn. Let me be cursed, let me be base and vile, but
let me also kiss the hem of that garment in which my God is
clothed. 3
Mitya, reviling while indulging his own Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde,
proclaims, "[Liet me be following the devil at the same time, but still I
am also your son, Lord." 37 He talks about the 'insects'... to whom
God gave sensuality" and calls himself "that very insect." 3 ' In noting
that "[hiere the shores converge, here all contradictions live together,"
he acknowledges the conflict and stresses that "[hiere the devil is
struggling with God, and the battlefield is the human heart."'39 For
Mitya, confession will induce the placation of that painful tension.
Before getting to the near nub, Mitya reminisces about his bacchanalian era of "thr[owing] fistfuls of money around" and binging in "music,
noise, [and] gypsy women. " 14 He, "speaking allegorically," claims to
have always "liked the back lanes, dark and remote little crannies, away
from the main square" where "there lay the unexpected []nuggets in the

131. MILLER, supranote 12, at 29 ("Dmitri shrewdly prefaces his own achingly personal
confession with a literary preamble in which he quotes many of Dostoevsky's favorite
writers.").
132. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 105.
133. Id. (emphasis added).

134. See id. at 107.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 108.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 108-09. It is just a "near" nub, because Mitya does not tell Alyosha the
complete truth. See infra notes 168, 184, 187-90 and accompanying text (addressing the
information that Mitya does not disclose to Alyosha).
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dirt. " "" His admission that he not only "loved depravity," but also "the
pleasure. 4 2
shame of depravity" conveys that shame is his guilty
While Mitya's "base desires" and "insect" sensuality thwart his ambition
to be perceived as the commensurate gentleman, they also help sate his
need to self-shame. 143 Significantly, we learn that, unlike his half
brother, Ivan, Mitya is acutely aware of the distinction between desiring
something and actually doing it.'" In fact, Mitya habitually tries on
behavioral options in the wardrobe of his mind before selecting one to
sport before society. 4 5 Ultimately, this quirk will detriment him at
trial, when Katerina furnishes the court with his drunken scribbling, in
46
which Mitya scripted the possible scenario of murdering his father.'
While tautologically insisting that he is "not dishonorable," Mitya
narrates a trilemma he once faced while serving as a seamy lieutenant
in a small town.'47 During that time, he learned that his colonel,
Katerina Ivanovna's father, had appropriated 4,500 roubles of government funds. 148 He hinted to his friend, Agafya, that he might be
willing to give her half sister, Katerina, the money if she would come to
him "secretly." 149 The crisis unfolds when Katerina, the "beauty of
beauties," appears in Mitya's room, prepared to sacrifice herself in
exchange for the roubles. 5 °
In his idiosyncratic way, Mitya mentally tests out alternative
modes-that of insect, merchant, or nobleman. His first was "a Karamazov thought," that of "a bedbug and a scoundrel."' 5 ' He, "breathless"
and ablaze with an impulse to seduce her right then and there, tempers
52
that with a pact that he would propose marriage the next day.' He
then realizes, however, that if he were later to offer Katerina his hand,

141.

DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 109.

142. Id.
143. Id. at 108-09.
144. See infra note 287 and accompanying text (discussing Ivan's proclivity to blur
together desire and conduct).
145. See MILLER, supra note 12, at 32-33. Readers "witness at flirsthand the struggle
between God and the devil in Mitya's heart. Mitya crisply presents that amorphous
conflict in terms of three potential scenarios that occur to him during his moment of crisis."
Id.
146. See infra notes 283-94 and accompanying text (describing the trial scene and
Ivan's mental breakdown on the stand).
147. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 109 ("[Tihough I have base desires and love
baseness, rm not dishonorable.").
148. Id. at 115-16.
149. Id. at 112.
150. id. at 111, 113.
151. Id. at 113.
152. Id. at 114.
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she would refuse to see him and even have him ejected.'53 Such a
prospect, infuriating him, propels Mitya from insectile to the second
mercantile mode: he contemplates "pull[ing] some mean, piggish,
merchant's trick" and "giv[ing] her a sneering look."" 4 He envisions
the cruel, sarcastic, mouth of a tradesman spewing, "But four thousand
is much too much! ... Perhaps two hundred, even gladly and with

pleasure, but four thousand-it's too much money, miss, to throw away
on such trifles." 5' He is so invested in this modus vivendi that he
comes perilously close to actually doing it, and although he thinks that
"such infernal revenge would be worth it all," he would spend the rest
of his life "howling with remorse."'56
After purportedly casting aside the "bedbug" or "evil tarantula"
smocks, the third suit, that of the nobleman, is the one that Mitya
actually decides to don.5 7 Mitya, who has six thousand roubles from
his father as a final settlement, "silently" extricates a five thousand
bank note, "hand[s] it to [Katerina,] open[s] the door to the hallway for
her, and, stepping back, bow[s] deeply to her, with a most respectful and
heartfelt bow."' 5
When Katerina, reciprocating, bows "with her
forehead to the ground" and exits, Mitya pulls his sword from its
scabbard, kisses it, and replaces it.'5 9 His gesture, with its phallic
implications, imparts libidinous lust, along with, albeit temporary, selfcontrol and civilized repression.'
Significantly, right before handing over the roubles, there is an
"ecsta[tic]" instant in which antipoints converge: Mitya feels such
153. Id.
154. Id.; see also MILLER, supra note 12, at 33 ("The Karamazov idea modulates into
the tradesman's idea ....Sensuality governs this idea as profoundly as it does the first,
for Mitya realizes that the ecstasy of that moment of delicious 'infernal revenge' would be
worth a lifetime of regret.") (quoting DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 114).
155. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 114.

156. Id.
157. Id. at 113-14.
158. Id. at 114.
159. Id. at 114-15 (explaining that her bow to the ground was "not like an institute girl
but like a Russian woman"); see supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text (discussing the
significance of bowing to the earth); see also Edward Wasiolek, Dmitry and Katerina, in

THE BROTHERS KARAmAZOV, supra note 115, at 719, 721 (explaining that "the hate and
contempt that [Katerinal ascribes to Dmitry is the hate and contempt she herself feels for
him") According to Wasiolek, the hatred Katerina feels started with "his bow, out of respect
to her," which "hurts." Id. "For with the bow Dmitry changes from one who abases and

humiliates to one who respects and forgives[, and) she hates the long low bow she must
return, for it acknowledges his triumph over her." Id.
160. See MILLER, supra note 12, at 90 ("Mitya had, in a gesture loaded with phallic
significance, pulled his sword from its scabbard, kissed it, and replaced it" which"embodied
both his lust and his honorable repression of it.").
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"terrible hatred" of "the kind... that is only a hair's breadth from love,
the maddest love," and when he touches his forehead16 to the "frozen"
window glass, "the ice burned [his] forehead like fire." ' This oxymoronic spasm suggests that Mitya, the very bundle of antipodal impulses,
is equally proficient at doing the "tarantula" sting or the "respectful"
bow; in fact, he can coterminously do both-that is, bow while stinging or
sting while bowing. 162 In conceding to Alyosha that it might seem as
if Mitya was "telling about all these agonies," and "filling them out a
little, to praise [himself]," Mitya implies that he likes to primp, posture,
and impress others. 163 As such, his honorable poses can and do invert
into dishonorable, self-interested deeds: they are at times neither
"respectful" nor "heartfelt," but calculated to manipulate others and selfaggrandize.'
The final component of his confession to Alyosha, revolving around the
three thousand roubles that Katerina entrusts to Mitya, mostly concerns
65 We can detect, however, that Mitya is
his self-besmirched honor.
not giving Alyosha (or the readers) the entire picture, and, as such, his
confession, which is incomplete, neither induces healing nor sates
him.1 6 In fact, the longer he nurses that burning secret-the part he
desperately needs to share but nevertheless withholds-the worse it gets
and will get for Mitya. It is essentially his stymying of full disclosure
that rankles and will ultimately subsidize his own destruction. As a
result, in his trial, there are no witnesses to attest to the buried facts,
which167are the very ones that might have exonerated Mitya of parricide.

As told to Alyosha, Katerina suddenly came into an inheritance,
returned the roubles that Mitya had given her, and sent Mitya a love
1
letter offering to be his fianc'e. 6 In replying, Mitya blunders by
"mention[ing] that she was now rich and had a dowry, and [he] was just
a poverty-stricken boor."169 This mentioning of money, by reminding
him of that vulgar tradesman persona he had rejected before handing
Katerina the five thousand roubles, infuses Mitya with "eternal[I"

161. DOsTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 114-15.
162. See id. at 114.
163. Id. at 115.
164. See id. at 114.
165. See id. at 115-22.
166. See id.

167. See infra notes 269-70 and accompanying text (explaining that the sole

on
corroboration of the remaining fifteen hundred roubles is Alyosha's sudden recollection

the witness stand of Mitya's chest-beating gesture).
168. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 115.
169. Id. at 116.
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shame.170 Then, after agreeing to be Katerina's fianc6 and even
vowing "to reform," Mitya begins to fan the fires of shame.17 ' Katerina
entrusts Mitya with three thousand roubles to bring secretly to
Agafya. 172
Instead, Mitya becomes romantically involved with
Grushenka and whisks her off to Mokroye, where they squander the
roubles in wild revelry, replete with partying "gypsy women" and
"champagne. " 17' Later, in what is one of his typical fibs, Mitya tells
Katerina74 that he had delivered the money and would provide a
1
receipt.

Miller aptly notices that Mitya "is more tormented by his squandering
of Katerina Ivanovna's money than he is by his terrible treatment of
her."17' Before his interrogation, trial, and decision to seek exile in
America, Mitya, in a primitive stage of evolution and missing something,
can see one thing and one thing only-Mitya. He is oblivious to
Katerina's feelings and to those of the many others whom he has hurt.
His behavior bears this out: for example, Mitya seizes his father's agent,
Snegiryov, by the beard in a tavern, drags him into the street, and beats
him publicly.17 The victim's humiliation spirals out to lacerate an
already destitute and ailing family.177 Similarly, Mitya whacks the old
servant, Grigory, with all his might and later smashes his skull with a
brass pestle.178 He also brutalizes his own father, "seiz[ing] the old
man by the two surviving wisps of hair on his temples, ... and

170. Id.
171. Id. at 117.
172. Id. at 119.
173. Id. at 118.
174. Id. at 119.
175. MILLER, supra note 12, at 35.
176. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 72 (stating that Mitya's father, Fyodor, exclaims,
"Think how he must treat others!" and elaborates, "[T]hree weeks ago our Dmitri
Fyodorovich seized [the poor captain] by the beard in a tavern, dragged him by that same
beard into the street, and there in the street publicly thrashed him").
177. Id. at 193 (describing Mitya's "rash and unjust act" of seizing Snegiryov's beard).
Katerina explains that when Mitya
seized [the captain] by the beard in front of everyone, led him outside in that
humiliating position, and led him a long way down the street,... the captain's
son, who goes to the local school, just a child, saw it and went running along
beside them, crying loudly and begging for his father, and rushing up to everyone
asking them to defend him, but everyone laughed.
Id. She adds that Snegiryov is "very poor" and "he and his family, a wretched family of
sick children and a wife-who, it seems, is insane-have fallen into abject poverty." Id. at
193-94. The incident-"one of those acts that [Mityal alone could bring himself to
do"-damages Snegiryov's family and causes his son to be bullied and teased. Id. at 193.
178. Id. at 138.

THE ROLE OF CONFESSIONS

20151

701

9
smash[ing] him against the floor."17 Then, in an encore of "kick[ing]
the fallen man in the face two or three times with his heel," he vows to
return to kill him."s Throughout these outbursts, reckless Mitya,
neglecting to consider other people and the consequences of acting on his
impulses, frets only over his wounds, his libidinous needs.
It is significant that Mitya vacillates between self-incrimination and
exculpation: "I can be a mean man, with passions mean and ruinous, but
a thief, a pickpocket, a pilferer, that Dimitri Karamazov can never
be!"' After reiterating, "I am a little thief, a pickpocket and pilferer"
and "a base sensualist, a mean creature with irrepressible passions,"
who spent the money because "he couldn't help himself, like an animal,"
he rebuts, "But he is not a thief."8i 2 Here Mitya repeatedly stops short
of holding himself in full contempt, which should make an attentive
reader surmise that he might be hiding something, like a key he is
saving for redemption. But it is only later that readers learn the hushhush detail that Mitya did not spend all of Katerina's money, but
8
instead kept half of it in a ragged pouch, nestled against his breast.
After dodging the consummation of a full and true confession, Mitya
steers over to a related topic, one involving his lascivious father, who is
in pursuit of Grushenka. In an envelope, "tied crisscross with a red
ribbon" (like Mitya's pouch), Fyodor has his own three thousand roubles,
which he promised to give Grushenka if she comes to him in the
night."' Mitya, in the throes of a potentially lethal and oedipal
triangle, tells Alyosha that he wants to kill and might not be able to
resist killing his father. 185 Mitya is similarly torn over the unspent

179. Id. at 139.
180. Id. (Mitya cries, -"Serves him right! . . . And if I haven't killed him this time, I'll
come back and kill him. You can't save him!"').
181. Id. at 119.
182.

Id.

183. See infra notes 224-49 and accompanying text (discussing Mitya's admission to his
interrogators after being accused of parricide).
184. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 120.
185. See SUSANNE Fusso, DISCOVERING SEXUALITY IN DOSTOEVSKY 113-14 (2006)
(explaining how "Dmitri and Fyodor are locked in a fierce struggle over Grushenka," a
"relationship ... often called 'Oedipal,' with the Freudian sense of the term in mind").

Fusso points out that "Dostoevsky's version of the father-son rivalry is closer to the original

myth of Oedipus (and its treatment in the tragedy of Sophocles) than to Freud's version.'
Id. at 114. She adds, "It is Laius's abandonment of Oedipus that makes psychologically
possible the realization of the prophecy he fears. Oedipus kills a father who is not really
a father (and marries a mother who is not really a mother) in Fetiukovich's sense .. . .'
Id.; see infra notes 301-06 and accompanying text (describing Fetyukovich's closing
argument); see generally SIGMUND FREUD, Dostoevsky and Parricide,in THE STANDARD
EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 175 (James
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fifteen hundred roubles, a confessional tidbit that he desperately needs
to share and yet refrains from sharing. At this point, for an unevolved
Mitya, resisting parricide and squandering roubles are in parity.
When Mitya later meets Alyosha, he supplements his confession with
kinesics, and thus digs a smidgeon deeper toward excavating interred
shame. Mitya calls himself a "scoundrel," and says, "right here, do you
see, right here a horrible dishonor is being prepared."" The narrator
gives us the clue that will later figure into the epiphany Alyosha has
during Mitya's trial:
(Als he said "right here," Dimitry Fyodorovich struck himself on the
chest with his fist, and with such a strange look as though the
dishonor was lying and being kept precisely there on his chest, in some
actual place, maybe in a pocket, or sewn up and hanging around his
neck. 187
Mitya says that "nothing can compare in baseness with the dishonor I
am carrying, precisely now, precisely at this moment, here on my chest,
here, right here, which is being enacted and carried out, and which it is
fully in my power to stop. "1s Subsequently, after bootlessly begging
Madame Khokhlakova for three thousand roubles, Mitya reenacts that
chest beating:
He walked like a madman, beating himself on the chest, on that very
place on his chest where he had beaten himself two days before, with
Alyosha, when he had seen him for the last time, in the evening, in the
darkness, on the road. What this beating on the chest, on that spot,
meant, and what he intended to signify by it-so far was a secret that
no one else in the world knew, which he had not revealed then even to
Alyosha, but for him that secret concealed more than shame, it
concealed ruin and suicide .... 189
Mitya will eventually translate these gestures into words, which is the
process he needs and will undertake on his own terms.
2. Confession to The Interrogators. The second confessional
episode begins with officials cornering Mitya to charge him with his
Strachey ed. & trans., 1961) (theorizing that Dostoevsky's father's violent demise filled him
with conflicted emotions that the novelist later visits in the Karamazov murder); but see
FRANK, supra note 12, at 45 ("The 'facts' that Freud adduces can be shown to be extremely
dubious at best, and at worst simply mistakes. . .
186. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 156.
187. Id.; see also infra 269-70 notes and accompanying text (describing Alyosha's
epiphany on the witness stand at Mitya's trial).
188. DosToEVsKY, supra note 1, at 156.
189. Id. at 388.
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father's murder.1 9 They employ nearly every trick in the book to
coerce and deliberately elicit information out of their suspect, and these
old Russian tactics uncannily simulate the ones in the pre- and post19
Miranda tool kit. ' As is similar to circumstances in the Ashcraft v.
9 2 the Russian authorities
Tennessee and Spano v. New York cases,'
keep the pressure on while Mitya is in custody9 and incommunicado for
Significantly, their
a prolonged period without sleep or rest.' '
would likely find
law
case
coercive machinations, ones Supreme Court
provocateurs
operative
the
violative of the Due Process Clause, are not
expel.
to
of the confession that Mitya is himself determined
The Russian interrogators even deliver Miranda-likeadmonitions that
they put in writing,
Mitya need not speak and can approve everything
9
Mitya, weary of
but their words are vacuous and inefficacious."
eager to expel
and
"beating himself on the chest," is so primed, ready,
95
self-coerced to
He,
that "secret that no one else in the world knew."
he feels he
what
purge his shame, will, in due time, launch
bellows,
in fact,
needs-namely, that public, humiliating flogging. Mitya,
96
decide my fate!"1
"[Ciome, gentlemen, crush me, punish me,
197
He admits
Right off the bat, Mitya admits to almost everything.
that he
not
he desired his father's death and "wanted to kill him," but
98
the
discerns
In contrast to Ivan, Mitya
is not guilty of murder.
99
bad
to
up
Mitya also owns
demarcation between desire and deed.
conduct, like beating and nearly killing his father and then °swearing
0
After
before witnesses that he would return to finish the job.
speaking of brutally bludgeoning and killing the servant, Grigory, the
prosecutor, Ippolit Kirillovich (Ippolit) informs Mitya that the old man
201
Although rejoicing, Mitya, who is still the
had actually recovered.

190. Id. at 444, 456-57.
191. Id. at 457-99; see supra Part H.A.1 (discussing the Due Process Clause and the
amounts
totality-of-the-circumstances test) and Part II.A.2 (discussing Miranda and what
to inherent coercion).
192. See supra Part II.A.1 (Due Process: Totality of the Circumstances) (describing
Due
factors in cases in which the Supreme Court found that state agents violated the
Process Clause).
193. DOsTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 457-99.
194. Id. at 468.
195. Id. at 388.
196. Id. at 458.
197. See id. at 460-61.
198. Id.
to blur
199. See infra note 287 and accompanying text (discussing Ivan's tendency
together desire and conduct).
200. DoSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 458.
201. Id.
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primitive Mitya, finds greater joy in the fact that he, no longer "a sinner
and evildoer," can more easily fulfill his dream of marrying Grushenka
than he does in the fact of Grigory's seemingly miraculous rebirth. °2
It is telling that after urging the officers to put it in writing that
"within himself, too, inside, in the bottom of his heart, he is guilty,"
Mitya, in reversal, says that "there's no need to write that down."20 3
Mitya challenges them to gouge away to extract his shame at heart's
bottom. What he seeks to still conceal, and yet wants to publicize, is the
existence of and deliberations over the fifteen hundred unspent roubles.
On an unconscious level, Mitya hopes that after poking and prodding,
the officers force him to publicize what he believes is his worst deed and
20 4
then indelibly immortalize it in ink.
One thing readers should discern is that Mitya bears more guilt and
shame over Katerina's roubles than he does over wishing his father
dead, beating him, and nearly killing the old servant, his surrogate
father, who "carried [Mityal in his arms... [and] washed [him] in a tub
when [he] was a three-year-old child and abandoned by everyone.2 0 5
In confessional foreplay, Mitya keeps protesting that "tilt is a noble man,
you are speaking with, a most noble person."0 6 After admitting that
he has "done a world of mean things," Mitya insists that he has always
"remained a most noble person.' 2° Like a toreador
taunting a bull
with a red banner, Mitya defies his bullies to charge, grab him, and gore
his ignoble, insectile core.
Mitya's words, "don't go digging around in my soul so much, don't
torment it with trifles," belie the fact that the "digging" and "tormenting"
is precisely what Mitya covets with every fiber of his soul.208 Mitya
even spurs them on by saying, "I'm the wolf, you're the hunters-so hunt
the wolf down."2 9 When the prosecutor asks Mitya why he needed
three thousand roubles, Mitya initially teases him with generic evasion:
"I wanted to repay a debt, a debt of honor, but to whom I won't say."10

202. Id. at 458-59.
203. Id. at 460.
204. See id. at 461-63.
205. See id. at 459; see MILLER, supra note 12, at 96 ("We learn that Mitya is more
tortured by the thought that he has been a thief than by the thought that he might have,
in a fit of fury, murdered Grigory.").
206. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 462.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 464.
209. Id. at 471.
210. Id. at 468.

20151

THE ROLE OF CONFESSIONS

705

Here, the prosecutor, detecting ambivalence, appears to steal from the
2
very manuals addressed in the Miranda decision. '
In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court, reviewing popular
techniques aimed to undermine the right to silence, explains that
trainers tell police "how to handle the individual who refuses to discuss
the matter entirely."2 12 They advise the examiner to at first "concede
him the right to remain silent," which will "disappoint B"the suspect in
his "expectation of an unfavorable reaction" and likewise "impress
2 13 Immediately
[him] with the apparent fairness of his interrogator."
"[aifter this psychological conditioning, however, the officer is told to
out the incriminating significance of the suspect's refusal to
point 2 14
talk.

Dostoevsky's prosecutor, Ippolit, could be the poster child for the
tactics censored in the Miranda decision. Ippolit concedes that Mitya
has "every right not to answer the questions that are put to [him]," and
that the interrogators, "on the contrary, have no right to extort
answers."2 15 Then, in the kind of monologue that once prompted
implementation of the Miranda safeguards, Ippolit underscores the
"incriminating significance" of Mitya's silence: "On the other hand, in
such a situation, it is our business to point out to you and explain the
full extent of the harm you will be doing yourself by refusing to give this
or that evidence."216
After Mitya is reminded that witnesses saw him with a wad of rouble
bills in his "blood-stained hands," he still adheres to his refusal to
address the source of the money.2 17 Shortly thereafter, the examiner
barrages him with a tactic resembling one described in Miranda:

211. Id.; see generally supra Part II.A.2 (Miranda:Coercion) (discussing the kind of
tactics that necessitate the Miranda safeguards).
212. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 453.
213. Id. at 453-54.
214. Id. at 454 ("Suppose you were in my shoes and I were in yours... and I told you,
'I don't want to answer any of your questions.' You'd think I had something to hide, and
you'd probably be right in thinking that."); see also supra Part II.B (Confessions:
Commentators) (discussing techniques that extract confession, even after implementation
of the Miranda safeguards).
215. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 468.
216. Id.; see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 454; DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 479 ("The
prosecutor intervened and again reminded him that a man under interrogation was of
course at liberty not to answer questions if he thought it more beneficial, and so on, but
in view of the harm the suspect might do himself by keeping silent .... ."); infra note 219
and accompanying text (discussing another suggestion by interrogators that silence is
damaging to the accused).
217. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 479.
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But could you not, without in the least violating your determination to
keep silent on this main point, could you not at the same time give us
at least some slight hint as to precisely what sort of compelling motives
might force you to keep silent at a moment so dangerous for you in
your evidence?21s
Although ostensibly potent and likely to extract that parricide admission, the message does not have its anticipated impact on the suspect,
who is hell-bent on publicly flagellating himself for a different, uncharged offense, one which for him is far more iniquitous than murdering one's father. Here, Mitya moves closer to realizing his goal by
219
letting his "cat out of the bag."
The Supreme Court has discussed the "cat out of the bag" metaphor:
"[After] an accused has once let the cat out of the bag by confessing, no
matter what the inducement, he is never thereafter free of the psychological and practical disadvantages of having confessed. He can never
get the cat back in the bag."220 Interrogators are thus taught to secure
a "tactical advantage" by pushing the "cat out of the bag," and reaching
what is referred to as the point of "breakthrough" or "beachhead."221
In Dostoevsky's view, confessants often force their own "cat[s] out of the
bag," and for Mitya, his feline escapes as an effort to justify silence:
I keep silent, gentlemen, because it involves a disgrace for me. The
answer to the question of where I got this money contains such a
disgrace for me as could not be compared even with killing and robbing
my father, if I had killed and robbed him. That is why I cannot speak.
Because of the disgrace.222
Mitya, baiting his examiners to press on, subliminally cordons the
"disgrace" that commands his silence to what urges and will unleash
speech.223 In a scene reminiscent of his earlier chest beating, Mitya

218. Id. at 480.
219. See id.; see generally Elstad, 470 U.S. at 311 (discussing the Oregon court's
identification of a "lingering compulsion, the psychological impact of the suspect's
conviction that he has let the cat out of the bag and, in so doing, has sealed his own fate");
infra notes 220-21 (explaining the metaphor).
220. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 311 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Bayer,
331 U.S. 532, 540-41 (1947)).
221. Id. at 328 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Interrogators describe the point of the first
admission as the 'breakthrough' and the 'beachhead,' which once obtained will give them
enormous 'tactical advantages." (citation omitted) (quoting R. ROYAL & S. SCHUTT, THE
GENTLE ART OF INTERVIEWING AND INTERROGATION: A PROFESSIONAL MANUAL AND GUIDE
143 (1976))).
222. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 480.
223. See id.
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uses body language to self-incriminate: he empties his pockets and
22
This enables
blurts, "[Hiere it is, my money, here, count it, take it."
the prosecution to calculate that Mitya originally had only about fifteen
Ironically, Mitya's surrender of the evidence of
hundred roubles.22
what he feels is his worst crime disappoints his legal examiners because
it is not what they consider their perfect evidence, and thus they feel
226
obligated to deploy more interrogation devices.
The Court in Mirandanoted that pursuant to police manuals, the key
to successful interrogation is the creation of an environment that makes
227
This "subjugate[s]
the subject feel alone, powerless, and vulnerable.
the individual to the will of [the] examiner," "carries its own badge of
22
intimidation," and destroys "human dignity." 1 Mitya's examiners
resort to an approach aimed to accomplish this, but here, it is over-kill.
The team, abrading Mitya's Achilles heel of desired-feared shame, orders
him to strip, which causes him to reflect, "If everyone is undressed, it's
not shameful, but when only one is undressed and the others are all
looking-it's a disgrace!"229 He then relishingly agonizes over each
stratum of unveiling:
But to take his socks off was even painful for him: they were not very
clean, nor were his underclothes, and now everyone could see it. And
above all he did not like his own feet; all his life for some reason he
had found both his big toes ugly, especially the right one with its
crude, flat toenail, somehow curved under, and now they would all see
it.230
This disrobing, which he professes to hate, excites such "unbearable
shame" that he is "suddenly" inspired to exacerbate his misery by
tearing off his own shirt.231 In so doing, he literally and figuratively
tries to bare his breast and then, effectually prolonging the demeaning
23 2
Although horridishabille, initially rejects replacement garments.
undergarments,
dirty
fied at the prospect that others might notice his
he gripes, "He
when
Mitya makes certain that these are noticed

224.
225.
226.

Id. at 481.
Id.
Id.

227. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457; see also supra Part II.A.2 (Miranda: Coercion)

(discussing techniques interrogators used to make their suspects feel alone, powerless, and

vulnerable).
228. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457.
229. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 484.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 484-85.
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examined my socks too closely, and had them turned inside out.., he
23 3
did it on purpose, to show everyone how dirty my underwear is!"

Shortly thereafter, Mitya, reaching what is, and has been all along, his
unconsciously appointed "breakthrough" or "beachfront," caves: "I will
reveal my secret to you... !... [RIeveal my disgrace."234
When Mitya reveals his full, true secret, it essentially, falling on deaf
ears, does him nothing but disservice. Mitya explains that the money
came from around his neck, where it was "sewn up in a rag" and where
he had been carrying it for about a month "with shame and disgrace." 5 The first time he took Grushenka to Mokroye, he only
"squandered half of that cursed three thousand" and hid the rest on his
breast "in place of an amulet."" 3 In his last binge with Grushenka, he
depleted half of that half as well. 7 At this juncture, Ippolit, who
fancies himself to be a pre-eminent psychologist, simply cannot fathom
why Mitya would "attach[U such extraordinary secrecy to this fifteen
hundred, . .. [and] connectU this secret.., with some kind of horror,"

and finds it "incredible that such a secret should cost [him] such torment
in confessing it."23

From there, Mitya's confessional process resembles the peeling of an
onion, whereby he whittles his way, layer by layer, into his soul's pith
in a futile effort to make his oppressors grasp his plight. Like the
earlier account to Alyosha regarding his gift of roubles to Katerina,
Mitya projects the alternatives he entertained, but doing it this time
with respect to that albatross-pouch that once dangled from his
neck. 9 For Mitya, the safeguarding of a portion of Katerina's money
had dual import-it served as a premeditated stab at quasi-redemption
and self-imposed hair shirt. Mitya scripts the hypothetical return of the
unspent roubles:
I go on a spree and spend only... half .... The next day I go to her
and bring her the other half: "Katya, take this half back from me, a
villain and a thoughtless scoundrel, because I've already squandered
one half, therefore I'll also squander the other, so put me out of harm's
way!". . . She would see at once that if he's brought her the one half,
233. Id. at 485 ("Well, what now, do you start flogging me with a birch, or what?").
234. Id. at 489; see alsoElstad, 470 U.S. at 328; supranote 221 and accompanying text
(describing "breakthrough" and "beachhead").
235. DoSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 490.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 491.
239. See supra notes 145-46, 151-60 and accompanying text (discussing Mitya's
proclivity to entertain alternative scenarios before acting and giving the example of his
confession to Alyosha).
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he'll also bring her the rest, the part he squandered, he'll spend his life
looking for it, he'll work, but he will find it and give it back.m'
But, as always for Mitya, there is a snag: from the beginning, his act
of setting aside the money, although somewhat expiatory, was nevertheWhen Mitya, however, tapped into
less "calculat[ed]" and "base[].""
that mitigative rouble reserve, he quashed the only thing that could
2
Realizing
conceivably elevate him from vile thief to mere scoundrel.
being
and
it,
that his interrogators neither understand nor believe
utterly "horriflied by their] lack of understanding," Mitya, paring it down
further, closes in on the mea culpa nub:
All the while I carried that fifteen hundred sewn up on my chest, I
kept saying to myself every day and every hour: "You are a thief, you
are a thiefl" And that's why I raged all month, that's why I fought in
the tavern, that's why I beat my father, because I felt I was a thief! I
could not bring myself, I did not dare to reveal anything about the
fifteen hundred even to Alyosha, my brother: so much did I feel myself
a scoundrel and a pickpocket.2' 3
By squandering half of the half and tossing the pouch's ragged sheath
into the gutter, Mitya forfeits both his mode of self-laceration and his
last shred of potential atonement. In his mind, this issues as a life
sentence or, as he put it, he thus "became a final and indisputable thief
... for the rest of [his] life."244 While the wily prosecutor contends
that he is "beginning to understand," it is apparent that he does and
does not.2'" Despite the fact that his suspect has just proclaimed
himself to be the proverbial seeker of torment, the prosecutor purports
to not grasp why Mitya would fail to return the fifteen hundred roubles
Intuiting,
to Katerina, and thus spare himself such torment."
however, what could devastate his victim the most, the prosecutor asks
why Mitya did not just tell all to Katerina and then, knowing of her
generosity, ply her for more roubles to fund his next romp with
Grushenka.2 47 Here, Mitya, jabbing at the very ganglion, avulses his
deepest, unmitigated shame-that he had actually considered that most
heinous option:

240. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 492.

241. Id. ("I set it aside out of baseness-that is, out of calculation, because calculation
in this case is baseness....").
242. Id.

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Id. at 493.
Id. at 493-94.
Id. at 494.
Id.
Id.
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Yes, gentlemen, I, too, had that thought during this cursed month, so
that I almost resolved to go to Katya, so base I was! But to go to her,
to announce my betrayal to her, and for that betrayal, to carry through
that betrayal, for the future expenses of that betrayal, to ask money (to
ask, do you hear, to ask!) from her, from Katya, and immediately run
off with another woman, with her rival, with her hater and offender
248

Mitya's earlier shout, "I've found out more in this one cursed night
than I'd have learned in twenty years of living," vaticinates what is in
the works. 249 After confession and all layers are stripped away,
readers can detect change (albeit still miniscule) in Mitya, who
experiences a tiny empathic twinge. Prior to full confession, Mitya,
preoccupied with himself and myopically fixated on his own "respectful"
and "heartfelt" bows in his suit of honor, stayed callously indifferent to
the pain he caused others and inflicted on his jilted fiancee.25 ° It is
only after unburdening his guilty shame that the feelings of others begin
to enter his awareness. For a flash, Mitya can actually imagine what
Katerina
might have felt had he asked her to finance her own betray1
al.

25

Readers here can detect another related, but equally inchoate, change
in Mitya. Mitya, who tended to fudge the line between truth and
untruth, begins to see that prevarication can hatch disaster. When the
prosecution reminds the accused that he himself was "spreading" rumors
and "even shout[ing] everywhere about the three thousand [he] had
spent.., and not fifteen hundred," and that there were "dozens" who
could attest to this, Mitya realizes the inherent fecundity of prevarication.25 2 Here, Mitya exclaims, "It means nothing, I lied, and everyone
started lying after me," and then adds, "So I lied, and that's it, I lied
once and then I didn't want to correct it."2531 Implicit in his question-'Why does a man lie sometimes?"-is a miniscule seed of spiritual

248. Id. at 495.
249. Id. at 486; see also Letter from Fyodor Dostoevsky to Nikolay Lyubimov (Nov. 16,
1879), in V DosToEvsKy LETTERS, 1878-1881, at 165 (David Lowe ed. & trans., 1991)
[hereinafter V LETTERS] ("[M]itya experiences a purification of his heart and conscience
under the storm of misfortune and false accusation.... His moral purification begins
during the several hours of preliminary investigation. .. ").
250. See DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 143; see also supra notes 145-46, 151-60 and
accompanying text (describing Mitya's consideration of various poses); supra notes 175-80
and accompanying text (addressing Mitya's indifference to Katerina's feelings and those
of others).
251. See DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 114.
252. Id. at 496.
253. Id.
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evolution, the onset of a newer Mitya, who is starting to seek answers
to things that matter.25 4
After his genuine confession, Mitya seems to intuit that what he said
2 55
His oppressors, with their prosecuis not enough and not believed.
torial reflex, find it incredible that not one witness knew about the
money in Mitya's pouch and start discrediting Mitya's facts."s In this
regard, the interrogators miss the mark on multiple fronts. They pat
themselves on their backs, deluding themselves into believing that
Mitya's admissions were the fruit of their own dexterous moves. What
is irrebutable, however, is that the only moves of significance were those
of Mitya himself. It was Mitya who ended up expelling what he needed
and intended to expel ab initio. In fact, he actually ends up thanking
257
On top of all this, the
them for taking a "burden from [his] soul."
prosecution instantly brainwashes itself to believe that Mitya's "facts,"
so preposterous and unsubstantiated, will actually bolster the parricide
conviction." 8 While their strategy literally prevails, in the broader
sense, it tragically loses by repelling the truth. That is, their hubristic
faith in their own skill at excavating good evidence reveals one thing
and one thing only-fools tend to find fool's gold.
Unlike a confession bestowed on a worthy soul, like monk Alyosha or
elder Zosima, Mitya's confessors are worthlessly unworthy players in a
paltry game of earthy justice. In this regard, Dostoevsky suggests that
law enforcers (and later counsel, judge, and jury) are ill equipped to
decipher confessions and assess their veracity. Prosecutor Ippolit, along
with his cronies, hasn't a clue what to do with the real deal-with
Tragically, in all of the wrangling
confessions of authenticity.259
between suspect and examiners, Mitya inadvertently entrusts the

254. See id.; see also FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, A WRITER'S DIARY 269 (Kenneth Lantz

trans., 1994) (1873-78) ("Why is it that all-every single one of us-tell lies?") [hereinafter
DOSTOEVSKY, A WRITER'S DIARY]. Dostoevsky states that "among other nations,... only
worthless people lie" and do it "for practical advantage... with direct criminal intent."
DOSTOEVSKY, A WRITER'S DIARY, supra at 269. He adds, "But in Russia the most honest
people can lie for no reason whatsoever and with the most honorable intentions," and

explains that the "vast majority of our lies are told for the sake of sociability ... to produce
an aesthetic impression on the listener, to make him feel good, and so people lie, even
sacrificing themselves to the listener." Id.
255. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 498 ("I see very well that you don't believe me! Not
a word, not a bit! It's my fault, not yours, I shouldn't have stuck my neck out. Why, why
did I defile myself by confessing my secret! And you think its funny, I can see by your
eyes.").

256.
257.
258.
259.

Id.
Id. at 499.
See id.
See id. at 488.
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prosecution with the rarest of roubles-the one that could and should
have solved the crime.28 When itemerged that Smerdyakov was the
"only one" who knew the whereabouts of Fyodor's hidden envelope, the
perpetrator's identity should have been plain as day.26' Like Katerina's roubles, Mitya's entrustment to the prosecution is squandered, and
the truth becomes "like pearls before swine."262
B. Miscarriageof Justice
The criminal trial in The Brothers Karamazov is detailed and drawn
out, filling almost one hundred and fifty pages, and ironically, in this
arena, the truth is the culprit that plays a pivotal role in the miscarriage
of justice.2"' Dostoevsky dispatches the message that while genuine
confessions can and sometimes do have a vital place in an individual,
spiritual tribunal, they tend to be out of place, misunderstood, or even
mephitic in a plebian courtroom.
Before his brother, Ivan Fyodorovich Karamazov (Ivan), takes the
stand, things go decently for Mitya, despite his recurrent outbursts.2 64
Although witnesses, Grigory and Dr. Herzenstube, attest to Mitya's
guilt, they inadvertently assist the defense by stirring compassion

260. See id. at 499.
261. Id.
262. Matthew 7:6 (King James) ("Give not that which is holy unto the dogs, neither cast
ye your pearls before swine, lest they trample them under their feet, and turn again and
rend you.").
263. DoSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 656-753 (Mitya's trial); see also Letter from Fyodor
Dostoevsky to Nikolay Lyubimov (Sept. 8, 1880), in V LETTERS, supra note 249, at 274-75.
Speaking of the trial scene in The Brothers Karamazov, Dostoevsky states he "consulted
beforehand with two prosecutors in Petersberg" and "both the defense attorney and the
prosecutor in my presentation are partly representative types from our contemporary
justice system (although they're not copies of anyone personally), with their mores,
liberalism, and view of their role". Letter from Fyodor Dostoevsky to Nikolway Lyubimov,
supra, at 274-75.
264. See, e.g., DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 661 ("But most striking was Mitya's
sudden outburst: as soon as the report on Smerdyakov was made, he exclaimed from his
seat so that the whole courtroom could hear: 'The dog died like a dog!'); id. at 666 ("Mitya
cried loudly. 'For combing the lice out of my hair, I thank him; for forgiving me my blows,
I thank him; the old man has been honest all his life, and was as faithful to my father as
seven hundred poodles."); id. at 668 ("Mitya shouted in a booming voice: 'He kept hitting
me for loans, even in prison! A despicable Bernard and careerist, and he doesn't believe in
God, he hoodwinked His Grace!'); id. at 673 ('Bravo, leech!' Mitya cried from his place.
'Precisely right!'); id. at 681 ("'Katya, why have you ruined me!' And he burst into loud
sobs that could be heard all over the courtroom."); id. at 688-89 ("Mitya suddenly yelled.
'I looked into your eyes, knowing that you were dishonoring me, and yet I took your money!
Despise the scoundrel, all of you, despise me, I deserve it!'); id. at 689 ('It's mine, mine!'
cried Mitya. 'If I hadn't been drunk, I'd never have written it...!' (ellipsis in original)).
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65 In particular,
through their memories of the accused as a toddler.
Herzenstube, who recalls feeling sorry for the forgotten child "running
in the dirt without any shoes and just one button on his little britches,"
266 According to Herzensends up buying him a gift-a pound of nuts.
tube, twenty-three years later, Mitya, still savoring that act of kindness,
came to thank him.267 This anecdote, which makes the doctor and
defendant weep, has a "favorable" impact on the public, and by
implication, on the jury as well. 2"
As expected, Alyosha, with unrivaled credibility, is instrumental to the
defense: he firmly avows that "it was not he who killed [my] father," and
by harkening back to the image of the accused beating his own breast,
Alyosha furnishes sole corroboration for Mitya's story about that little
pouch of roubles on his neck.269 Also, the fact that Alyosha spontaneously comes to his realization about the significance of that gesture
10
while he is on the stand ostensibly adds considerable credence.
Moreover, Alyosha's testimony fortifies some of the more effective
techniques of Mitya's defense counsel, Fetyukovich.
Fetyukovich, whose appellation means "blockhead," is based on V.D.
Spasovich, a famous Russian lawyer and law professor at the University
of St. Petersburg. 1 Despite his unflattering name and Dostoevsky's
disparagement of his prototype Spasovich, his Fetyukovich, a mixed bag,
does an able job discrediting prosecution witnesses. 272 Fetyukovich, by
getting Grigory to admit that he was drunk as a skunk, casts doubt on
his damaging testimony about the open garden door, and then punctuates that with a humorous biblical allusion: after "a tumbler and a half
of pure spirits" anyone might "see 'the doors of heaven open,' not to
mention the door to the garden."273 He, equally skilled in impeaching

265. See, e.g., id. at 675.
266. Id. at 674.
267. Id. at 675.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 677 (emphasis added).
270. Id. ('I now recall one circumstance I had quite forgotten; it was not at all clear
to me then, but now...' And Alyosha excitedly recalled, obviously having just hit upon the
idea himself, how during his last meeting with Mitya, in the evening, by the tree, on the
road to the monastery, Mitya, hitting himself on the chest... ." (first ellipsis in original)).
271. See MILLER, supra note 12, at 126 (discussing Spasovich).
272.

See supra DOSTOEVSKY, A WRITER'S DIARY, supra note 254, at 364-84 (attacking

273.

DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 665.

Spasovich and his tactics); but see Letter from Fyodor Dostoevsky to Appollon Maykov
(Mar. 2, 1871), in III LETTERS, supra note 122, at 321, 321 (showing when Dostoevsky
sought legal representation, he wrote, "I ask you most earnestly togive over... the matter
to a well-known attorney (Spasovich, ... or someone like that)-no matter what it costs
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Rakitin, "one of the most important witnesses" for the prosecution,
exploits a testimonial "slip" to lay bare hostility and bias.274 He
further impresses the jurors with the fact that Trifon Borisovich, "one of
the most dangerous witnesses brought forward by the prosecution," is
dishonest when it comes to money.275 After Fetyukovich is done with
this innkeeper, the witness "le[aves]
under suspicion ... with his
276
reputation rather besmirched."

After all of these positive developments, what goes so horribly wrong?
Although this might sound counterintuitive, the glitch can be attributed
partially to overabundant truth. When truth spews from the mouth of
Ivan, it turns the tide to foster a lie-an erroneous verdict. When Ivan
takes the stand, he is, as Dostoevsky once said about his famous
character, Rodion Raskolnikov, trapped and "compelled to denounce
himself.2 77 Of course, Ivan is literally free to leave, which is underscored by the fact that at one point he pulls a characteristic Ivan,
changes his mind, and "turn[s] and start[s] out of the courtroom."27
But Ivan's coercive demons lurch him back to "his former place
again."2 79 Ivan, making light of his own erraticism, recites a folk
custom with a peasant girl, teasing, "I'll jump if I want, I won't if I
don't."2 0 This jingle belies Ivan's indecision: "I want," "I won't," "I
8 As readers
don't." s1
see, Ivan eventually commits to that want, will,
2
and do, but when he does, he mentally breaks down on the stand.1
After handing the stolen money to the bailiff, Ivan comes clean: "I got
it from Smerdyakov, the murderer, yesterday. I visited him before he
hanged himself. It was he who killed father, not my brother. He killed
him... on my instructions ...Who doesn't wish for his father's death
.?"
Ivan discloses his guilt and desire for his father's death, but

274.
275.
276.
277.

Id. at 666-67.
Id. at 670.
Id.
Letter from Fyodor Dostoevsky to Mikhail Katkov (Sept. 27, 1865), in II
DOSTOEvsKY LErERS, 1860-1867, 174, 175 (David A. Lowe ed. & trans., 1989) [hereinafter
II LETTERs]. Dostoevsky, who is in the process of writing Crime and Punishment, says that
"[ilt
is the psychological account of a crime" in which "[a]
young man, expelled from the
university, petit-bourgeois by social origin, and living in extreme poverty, after yielding to
certain strange, 'unfinished' ideas floating in the air, has resolved, out of light-mindedness
and out of the instability of his ideas, to get out of his foul situation at one go." Id. at 174.
278. See DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 685.
279. See id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. See id. at 686.
283. Id. (second and last ellipsis in original).
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2
at first tempers it by identifying Smerdyakov as the perpetrator. 4
Then lickety split, Ivan vicariously owns the blame by equating his
When he
omission to prevent murder with conduct of instructing it.'
mere
transcending
Ivan,
murderer,"
a
finally blurts, "I'm simply
2
so
In
1
liability.
criminal
direct
respondeat superior status, accepts
him:
for
true
so
is
that
something
doing, his confession expresses
7
wishing for something and doing it are one and the same.
The problem is that Ivan's confession-all too true and genuine-exposes
his raw nerve, spiritual crisis, doubts, and instability, which have
tormented him throughout the novel. By asking, "Who doesn't wish for
his father's death?" and answering, "Everyone wants his father dead,"
he does not merely prick a universal Freudian nerve;' Ivan also fuses
collective guilt with personal guilt, and thus, effaces the boundary
between the two, which, in his mind, simply does not exist.
In response to the judge's demand for evidence, Ivan searches for his
89
For Ivan,
witness, his devil, who is "sure to be here somewhere."
with the
table
the
under
who is convinced that the devil is "there,
stand,
the
on
while
material evidence," reality and fantasy merge, and,
he
and
silent,
keep
Ivan elaborates, "I told him [the devil] I would not
the
After
,290
....
started telling me about the geological cataclysm
judge asks, "How can you confirm such a confession," Ivan caves: "That's
the trouble, I have no witnesses. That dog Smerdyakov won't send you
evidence from the other world ... ."" At this juncture, Ivan, who
professes not to believe in divine justice, has demonstrated right before
2
After collapsing,
his very eyes that there is no justice here on earth.
the witness, along with his genuine and true confession, is evicted from
the courtroom.29 3

284. Id.
285. Id.
286. See id.
287. See BROOKS, supra note 4, at 59 ("[Whereas Mitya is forever making distinctions
between thoughts and deeds, Ivan's confession thoroughly blurs them, offering Smerdyakov's deed as a version of his own thoughts, and indeed of everyone's thoughts.").
288. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 686; see also MILLER, supra note 12, at 91
(describing Mitya coming to kill his father with the brass pestle in his pocket as a "fraught,
Freudian, Oedipal moment," with "a shocking phallic icon: the young son drawing his
pestle from his pocket to do battle with his father."); supra note 185 (discussing Freudian
theory as applied to The Brothers Karamazov).
289. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 687.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 686.
292. See id. at 235-36, 686.
293. Id. at 687.
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When Katerina, initially Mitya's friendly witness, testified the first
time, the accused prophetically shouted, "Katya, why have you ruined
me!"'
When Mityz opens his mouth, he brings that prophesy to
fruition. After Ivan, the man Katerina truly loves, incriminates himself,
she swoops in to save him, brandishing an epistolary sword against
Mitya. 8 She delivers Mitya's letter, one composed in a drunken
stupor, in which he "described beforehand, everything exactly as he
killed him afterwards, the whole program."2 96 What Katerina says
about herself and her dysfunctional relationship with Mitya is true and
accurate, and the document looks like irrefutable, "mathematical" proof
against the accused.2 97
Perversely, Katerina, the only participant fearing that Ivan is guilty,
helps secure a guilty verdict against Mitya, whom she does not think is
guilty.9 Defense counsel, Fetyukovich, shares blame for the miscarriage of justice as well. In flagrant breach of his duty to zealously
advocate on behalf of his client, he helps seal Mitya's doom. Concededly
Fetyukovich starts off nicely by essentially proving his thesis that
"psychology, ... though a profound thing, is still like a stick with two
ends" and deftly counters each of the prosecutor's psychological
theories. 9 After asserting that although "the overwhelming totality
of facts is against the defendant," Fetyukovich, honoring his promise,
shows that "there is not one fact that will stand up to criticism, if it is
considered separately, on its own."00
Later, shifting to a "new, heartfelt voice, quite unlike the one in which
he had been speaking so far," Mitya's advocate, becoming his "blockhead"
namesake, snatches defeat from the jaws of any conceivable victory." 1
Fetyukovich, who never believed in his client's innocence, commits
misfeasance when he lets these feelings leak to the jury.30 2 It occurs

294. Id. at 681.
295. See id. at 688-89.
296. Id. at 689.
297. Id. at 688 ("The paper she handed over was that same letter Mitya had written
from the 'Metropolis' tavern, which Ivan Fyodorovich referred to as a document of
'mathematical' importance.... [It was acknowledged precisely as mathematical, and had
it not been for this letter, Mitya would perhaps not have perished, or at least not have
perished so terribly!").
298. See MILLER, supra note 12, at 128-29 ("The dreadful irony of this scene is that, to
defend Ivan, Katerina Ivanovna makes her consummate accusation of Mitya at the very
moment when she believes 'all of a sudden' that it is Ivan who is guilty.").
299. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 727.
300. Id. at 726.
301. Id. at 741; see also supranote 271 and accompanying text (discussing the meaning
of Fetyukovich's name-"Blockhead").
302. DOSToEVSKY, supra at note 1, at 741-42.
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when he lodges a fallback position, one that not only is unnecessary, but
also undermines his earlier, more effective, closing statement. After
conceding that homicide, especially parricide, is horrific, Fetyukovich
guilt: "[Wihat if
goes where he ought not go by positing hypothetical
3 °3 After reviewing Fyo[Mityal did kill him and goes unpunished?"
dor's reprehensibility, Mitya's tragic childhood, and the events on the
night of the murder, Fetyukovich suggests that if Mitya did kill, it was
due to understandable, unpremeditated indignation:
[Hie did not break into his house in order to kill him, oh, no .... A
feeling of hatred took hold of him involuntarily, unrestrainably; to
reason was impossible: everything surged up in a moment It was
madness and insanity, a fit of passion, but a natural fit of passion,
avenging its eternal laws unrestrainably and unconsciously, like all
things in nature.'
Suddenly catching himself, Fetyukovich tries to unring the bell by
0 5 From there, he
asserting, "But even then the killer did not kill."
embellishes his sophistic sequitur: since "such a father as the murdered
old Karamazov cannot and does not deserve to be. . . a father," it thus
°
follows that "[sluch a murder is [neither] murder" nor parricide."
What surfaces in the oratory is disbelief in his client's innocence and the
implication that Mitya committed the crime. Ironically, Fetyukovich,
who had faulted opposing counsel for pretending to be both "prosecutor
commits the same offense by serving himself as prosecuand30defender,"
7
tor.

303. Id. at 742 (emphasis added).
304. Id. at 746.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 744, 747; see also Letter from Fyodor Dostoevsky to an Unidentified
Addressee (Mar. 27, 1878), in V LETTERS, supra note 249, at 24, 25. Explaining what it
really means to be a parent and giving advice on child rearing, Dostoevsky recommends
that the mother "acquaint [the eight-year old] with the Gospel [and] teach him to believe
in God strictly according to the law". Letter from Fyodor Dostoevsky to an Unidentified
Addressee, supra. He adds,
Imagine that your child, grown to be fifteen or sixteen, comes to you... and asks
you or his father a question such as "Why should I love you and why ought I to
make that an obligation for myself?" Believe that at that point no knowledge or
questions will help, and besides, there won't even be any point in answering him.
And therefore you need to manage it so that he doesn't even come to you with such
a question.
Id.
307. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 742 ("[11n his ardent speech my esteemed opponent
...exclaimed several times: 'No, I shall not turn over the defense of the accused to anyone,
I shall not yield his defense to the defense attorney from Petersburg-I am both prosecutor
and defender!").

718

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

Fetyukovich's botch, in combination with Katerina's sandbag, fuels
what is and has been inevitable from day one-a miscarriage of justice.
Brooks attributes the problem, at least partially, to the fact that "Ivan's
confession is too true to be believed."0 8 The same could be said of all
of Mitya's attestations, like the shame he attached to the remnants of
Katerina's roubles, his "drunkenness and depravity," and, of course, his
innocence of the crime for which he has been charged. 0 9 Things go
terribly awry not just because of an over abundance of truth, but also
because a mortal construct, like the legal system, is simply not designed
to, and cannot, accommodate genuine confessions. The judge, telling
Ivan, "[Your words are incomprehensible and impossible in this place,"
delivers that message loud and clear.31 °
When the legal system latches onto a rare, bona fide confession, like
Mitya's, which is compelled by shame, or Ivan's, which is borne of
spiritual crisis, it is fated to ignore, misunderstand, or misinterpret it.
In fact, not infrequently, a false or unreliable confession is used to
convict, while the true one is cast aside. The Russian novelist knew this
well, and some members of the Supreme Court have similarly expressed
distrust of confessional evidence. One example is Colorado v. Connelly,
in which the record was "barren of any corroboration of the mentally ill
defendant's confession," and lacked "a shred of competent evidence...
linking the defendant to the charged homicide." 1 But even with
"overwhelming evidence in the record point[ing] to the unreliability of
[his] delusional mind," Connelly, a diagnosed, chronic, paranoid
schizophrenic, is convicted on the sole basis of words from his own
mouth.312 The Connelly dissenters wrote separately to acknowledge
"distrust for reliance on confessions" and stated that the matter sub
judice "starkly highlights the danger[s] .'
Unlike Connelly, when Ivan speaks with raw candor, he, branded the
unreliable madman, is removed from the courtroom.314 In The Brothers Karamazov, there is an analogue in elder Zosima's autobiographical
recollection of Mikhail, who confessed to murdering a woman for
rejecting his marriage proposal.3 15 Although Zosima comes to believe
him, when Mikhail furnishes his statement to the authorities, along with

308.

BROOKS, supra note 4, at 60.

309. See, e.g., DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 661.
310. Id. at 686.
311. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 183 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 29-38
(discussing Connelly).
312. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 183 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
313. Id. at 182-83.
314. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 687.
315. See id. at 310.
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plenty of tangible corroborating evidence that he saved for fourteen
years, they reject it and issue the "verdict ...that the unfortunate man
316
is
Even after the "authenticity" of his evidence
3 17
had gone mad."
unfinished."
left
be
to
"destined
is
verified, the case languishes and
Dostoevsky lets us know, however, that Mikhail's confession, although
discredited and ignored by the earthly justice system, secures a place
elsewhere. On his death bed, Mikhail, "feel[ing] joy and peace for the
first time after so many years," speaks to Zosima:
I at once felt paradise in my soul, as soon as I had done what I had to
do. Now I dare to love my children and kiss them. No one believes
me, neither my wife nor the judges; my children will never believe me
either. In that I see the mercy of God towards my children. I shall die
and for them my name will remain untainted. And now I am looking
towards God, my heart rejoices as in paradise... I have done my duty
318

The author indicates that what imbues Mikhail's confession with
import has nothing to do with the justice system, but instead has all to
do with its function as the preliminary step along a highly individual,
3 19
spiritual trajectory.
In a letter, Dostoevsky shares his "idea that the legal punishment
imposed for a crime frightens the criminal much less than lawmakers
think, in part because [the criminal] himself psychologically demands
it."32 ° His thoughts shed light on Mitya's decision to dodge his Siberian sentence and instead seek exile in America. Although, for some
readers, this presents a conundrum, it makes sense as a middle
ground." 1 Mitya, who admitted guilt for all sorts of heinous deeds, did

316.
317.
318.
319.

Id. at 311.
Id.
Id. at 311-12.
See infra notes 353-60 and accompanying text (discussing Mitya's dream after his

confession-the inauguration of a spiritual rebirth).
320. Letter from Fyodor Dostoevsky to Mikhail Kathov, supra note 277, at 175

(explaining how his character, Raskolnikov, seeks his own punishment).
321. See generally Paul J. Contino, IncarnationalRealism and the Case for Casuistry:
Dmitry Karamazov's Escape, in ART, CREATIvITY, AND SPIRITUALITY, supra note 4, at 131,
131 (discussing the debate over whether Mitya "[sihould accept his sentence in Siberia or
escape to America with Grushenka" and concluding that Mitya's ultimate decision is "a
THE
good one"); but see GARY ROSENSHIELD, WESTERN LAw, RUSSIAN JUSTICE: DoSTOEVSKY,
are
escape]
defending
[in
words
("Alyosha's
JURY TRIAL, AND THE LAW 211 (2005)

essentially a paraphrase of the devil's (Fetyukovich's) words on spiritual resurrection.");
Carol Flath, The Passion of Dmitrii Karamazov, 58 SLAVIC REV. 584, 595 (1999) ("[Ilt is
inconceivable that Dmitrii should accede to the pressure to flee to America; instead he
must go into Siberian exile, go below the earth (in an analogy to Christ's time spent in the
tomb, or perhaps to his entire life spent 'below,' here on earth).").
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not kill his father. Alyosha advises him to not take on more than he can
bear, and Mitya knows that he is not built to bear that Siberian
"martyr's cross" with floggings and no Grushenka.3 22 Alyosha
concurs:
But you're innocent, and such a cross is too much for you. You wanted
to regenerate another man in yourself through suffering; I say just
remember that other man always, all your life, and wherever you
escape to-and that is enough for you. That you did not accept that
great cross will only serve to make you feel a still greater duty in
yourself, and through this constant feeling from now on, all your life,
you will
do more for your regeneration, perhaps, than if you went
32
there. 3

Both Mitya and Dostoevsky, who himself experienced self-imposed
exile, know that severance from Russian soil is not a cakewalk.8 24 For
someone like Russia-loving Mitya, who has indulged in creature
comforts, physical toil "in solitude, in some remote place" will flog him
enough to meet his "psychological[] demands. " 2'
IV. CONCLUSION
In the Due Process and Miranda contexts, the Court aims to ensure
that confessions are the product of free and rational choices.8"' In
Sixth Amendment decisions, which purport to protect the integrity of the
adversarial process, the freedom and rationality behind confessions are

322. See DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 763.
323. Id. at 763-64; see also Contino, supra note 4, at 148 (asserting that "[tihough guilty
of much, Mitya is innocent of the murder of his father" and that "considerations of
proportion and readiness must enter into his decision"). Contino explains that "[t~wenty
years in Siberia, bereft of Grushenka, would be a disproportionate punishment, and given
his impulsive character, an imprudent burden for him to shoulder." Id.
324. See generally Letter from Fyodor Dostoyevsky to Appollon Maykov (Aug. 16,1867),
in II LETERS, supranote 277, at 251, 251 (describing his self-imposed exile abroad during
the time he sought to escape his creditors in Russia). Dostoevsky writes,
I have landed, in addition, in an alien land, where not only is there not a Russian
face, Russian books, or Russian thoughts and cares to be found, but not even a
friendly face! Really, I can't even understand how a Russian abroad, if only he
has feelings and sense, can fail to notice this and feel it painfully .... And how
can one spend one's life abroad? Without one's native land it's suffering, honest
to God! ... But to go the way I have, without knowing and without foreseeing
when rl return, is very bad and distressing.
Id. (footnote omitted).
325. DOSTOEvsKY, supra note 1, at 765; Letter from Fyodor Dostoevsky to Mikhail
Katkov, supra note 277, at 175.
326. See supra Part I.A. & 2 (summarizing seminal Supreme Court decisions on
confessions under the Due Process Clause and Miranda).
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also aspirational. 2 7 Confession jurisprudence is all about externalities, with relevant factors being the conduct of state agents, coercive
32 8 While the Supreme
techniques, or deliberate elicitation tactics.
Court has touted the value of confessions, it also has expressed mistrust
in such evidence.3 29
Dostoevsky, writing on a very different page, could not be more
mistrustful of confessions, especially ones that stray into criminal
prosecutions. According to him, confessions are an elusive phenomenon
of infinite variety, and the psychological and spiritual forces that coerce
them tend to be unfree and irrational. Further, he would find the
Supreme Court's concern with outer coercers as fatuous as some of
Fyodor Karamazov's notions, and the installed Miranda safeguards as
33
inutile as Doctor Herzenstube's placebos. ' Dostoevsky believed that
in the justice system, confessions are not just valueless, but frequently
do more harm than good by actually thwarting the putative truthfinding process. Even "blockhead" Fetyukovich seems to understand."l
In one of his better moments, Fetyukovich suggests that confessions
should not be determinative without ample corroboration. In his closing
statement, Fetyukovich, talking anecdotally about a boy accused of
killing a shopkeeper and robbing him of fifteen hundred roubles,
describes the evidence:
About five hours later he was arrested, and ... the entire fifteen
hundred was found on him. Moreover, the shop clerk, who returned to
the shop after the murder, informed the police not only of the amount
stolen, but also of what sort of money it consisted-that is, so many
hundred-rouble bills, so many fifties, so many tens, so many gold coins
the same bills and coins
and precisely which ones-and then precisely
were found on the arrested murderer. 2

327. See supraPart llA.3 (summarizing seminal Supreme Court confession cases under
the Sixth Amendment).
328. See supra Part IIA (summarizing Supreme Court confession cases).
329. See generally Part I.A; see also supranotes 29-38, 312-14 (discussing the Connelly
decision and the dissent).
330. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text (describing Fyodor Karamazov's
incorrect lecture on the history of confessions). As for Doctor Herzenstube, as Madame
Khokhlakov keeps pointing out, he is "terrible and eternal," his treatments don't work and
he "always comes and says he can make nothing of it." DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 18182. Madame Khokhlakov's daughter, Lise, agrees: "Your Herzenstube will come and say
he can make nothing of it!" Id. at 182.
331. See supra note 271 and accompanying text (explaining "blockhead").
332. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 730-31.
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After explaining that "[o]n top of that there followed a full and frank
confession from the murderer that he had... taken that very money,"
Fetyukovich says, "This, gentlemen of the jury, is what I call evidence!"'
Of course, if there is such abundant evidence for a conviction, then the confession, mere surplusage, need not be introduced at all,
and Dostoevsky would likely concur with that proposition.33"
Throughout Dostoevsky's novels, loquacious people admit to things
they did or did not do. The Brothers Karamazov is set in Skotoprigonevsk, a town in which almost everyone is coming clean. 35 As to be
expected, elder Zosima has his flock of confessants, like the peasant who
shares her grief after the burial of her three year old son, and the
mother who anguishes over her adult son's neglect to keep in touch. 3
He also hears Madame Khokhlakova's confession that she "suffer[s] from
...lack of faith," as well as that of a "wasted, consumptive-looking"
peasant woman with "two burning eyes," who whispers that she
murdered her abusive husband. 7
Similarly, Alyosha gets an ear full: on top of Mitya's and Ivan's
confessions, Katerina tells Alyosha that she knew all along that Mitya
had failed to deliver the roubles and that she would endure anything
from or for her faithless fianc6. 33' Grushenka, confessing to being as
"wicked as can be," admits to the young monk that she wanted to ruin
him and promised Rakitin twenty-five roubles if he would deliver the
prey to her door. 9 Kolya relates the details of his bond with Ilyusha,
which ruptured when, upon Smerdyakov's urging, Alyosha tortured
Kolya's own beloved dog by feeding him bread with a pin in it.340

333. Id. at 731 (emphasis added); see also BROOKS, supra note 4, at 153 ("Perhaps the
only truly probative way to detect and exclude the false confession would be insistence that
the alleged crime be convincingly substantiated by other means (apparently the procedure
in German courts)."). Brooks adds, "But taken to its logical conclusion, this would be
tantamount to saying that we do not need to use confessions in criminal procedure."
BROOKS, supra note 4, at 153-54.; but see Leo, et al., supra note 99, at 764-65 (proposing
that "judges ...take a more active role in preventing false confessions from being
introduced into evidence at trial by considering the reliability of confession evidence at a
pretrial hearing").
334. See BROOKS, supra note 4, at 153-54.
335. Sara Paretsky, Afterword to the Brothers Karamazov, SARAPARETSKY.COM,
www.saraparetsky.cm/books/essay/afterword-to-the-brothers-karamazov/(lastvisitedSept.
29, 2014).
336. DOsTOEvSKY, supra note 1, at 48-51.
337. Id. at 51, 55.
338. Id. at 188-89.
339. Id. at 353.
340. Id. at 535 ("[Ilyusha] had somehow managed to make friends with Smerdyakov
...[who] had taught the little fool a silly trick-that is, a beastly trick, a vile trick-to take
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Kolya, in fact, flashes more of his "egoistic vanity and base despotism,"
which have plagued him his whole short life and prevented him from
34
visiting his dying companion. '
However, enlightened Alyosha is not himself devoid of the confessant
gene, which readers learn through secrets bandied back and forth
between him and his betrothed, Lise Khokhlakov. Alyosha tells Lise
that his "brothers are destroying themselves" and confesses that he
'42
Later, after Lise confesses to
might not "even believe in God."
Alyosha that she hates happiness, "want[s] someone to torment [her],"
would like to "set fire to the house" or "kill somebody," and has vile
dreams of devils and of "abusing God out loud," he ponies up to having
had the same dreams. 3
In Skotoprigonevsky, the popular pastime is not only confession, but
also the pontification of various philosophies, of which the two most
prominent are diametrically opposed. On one end of the spectrum
3
presides the cannibalistic credo that "everything is permitted."
Pyotr Alexandrovich encapsulates the idea that devilishly torments Ivan
and sporadically ensnares others as well:
[TIhere is decidedly nothing in the whole world that would make men
love their fellow men; that there exists no law of nature that man
should love mankind, and that if there is and has been any love on
earth up to now, it has come not from natural law but solely from
people's belief in their immortality.... [WIere mankind's belief in its
immortality to be destroyed, not only love but also any living power to
continue the life of the world would at once dry up in it. Not only that,
but then nothing would be immoral any longer, everything would be
permitted, even anthropophagy."

a piece of bread, the soft part, stick a pin in it, and toss it to some yard dog, the kind that's
so hungry it will swallow whatever it gets without chewing it...
341. Id. at 556.
342. Id. at 220.
343. Id. at 581-83; see also id. at 40 (showing Fyodor Karamazov confesses to being a
"buffoon"); id. at 407 (showing Pyotr Ilych confesses to Mitya that he stole twenty kopecks
from his mother when he was nine); id at 440 (showing inebriated Grushenka confesses
to the partying Poles that she is "wicked" and asks for forgiveness).
344. Id. at 263; see also infra note 346 and accompanying text (giving examples of other
places in the novel in which that philosophy surfaces).
345. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 69; see also id. at 82 (Rakitin, discussing Ivan, says,
"did you hear his stupid theory just now: 'If there is no immortality of the soul, then there
is no virtue, and therefore everything is permitted); id. at 263 (Alyosha asks Ivan if he
plans to "drown in depravity,... stifle [his] soul with corruption" and live as if'everything
is permitted'); id. at 313, 317 (asking, In "From Talks and Homilies of the Elder Zosima"
a question: "[Is it only a dream, that in the end man will find his joy in deeds of
enlightenment and mercy alone, and not in cruel pleasures as now-in gluttony, fornication,
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At the other end of the spectrum is what Zosima calls the "experience
of active love," which he summarizes:
Try to love your neighbors actively and tirelessly The more you
succeed in loving, the more you'll be convinced of the existence of God
and the immortality of your soul. And if you reach complete selflessness in the love of your neighbor, then undoubtedly you will believe,
and no doubt will even be able to enter your soul. 3"

ostentation, boasting, and envious rivalry with one another?"); id. at 577 (defining the
insanity defense or "[a]legal fit of passion" as something "for which they forgive
everything. Whatever you do-you're immediately forgiven"); id. at 589 (Mitya explains,
"Without God and the future life? It means everything is permitted now, one can do
anything?"); id. at 593 (Mitya, discussing Ivan with Alyosha, mentions that Ivan believes
that "everything is permitted" and said that "our papal] was a little pig, ... but his
thinking was right."); id. at 604 ("[Smerdyakov] even managed to insult Ivan... in this
first meeting, telling him abruptly that he was not to be suspected or questioned by those
who themselves assert that 'everything is permitted.'); id. at 625 (Smerdyakov says to
Ivan, "You used to be brave once, sir, you used to say 'Everything is permitted.'); id. at
632 (Smerdyakov tells Ivan, "I did have.., a dream, sir, and even more so as 'everything
is permitted" and asks, "You yourself kept saying then that everything was permitted, so
why are you so troubled now...? You even want to go and give evidence against yourself
....
" (second ellipsis in original)); id. at 649 (showing the devil repeats "everything is
permitted" and explains, "Where God stands-there is the place of God! Where I stand,
there at once will be the foremost place... 'everything is permitted,' and that's that!"); id.
at 696-97 (In his speech, the prosecutor says, that "Ivan... had horrified [Mityal with his
spiritual unrestraint" and "'[elverything, according to him, is permitted, whatever there is
in the world, and from now on nothing should be forbidden.').
346. Id. at 56; see also id. at 217 (Alyosha tells Lise that "we are just the same, not
better," and "my elder said once that most people need to be looked after like children, and
some like the sick in hospitals."); id. at 289 (explaining how Elder Zosima's brother realizes
that "each of us is guilty before everyone, for everyone and everything" and says, "[Liet me
also be the servant of my servants, the same as they are to me"); id. at 298 (after striking
his servant, Zosima has a question that "pierced" him: "Mother, heart of my heart, truly
each of us is guilty before everyone and for everyone, only people do not know it, and if
they knew it, the world would at once become paradise"); id. at 303 (explaining that a
mysterious visitor tells Zosima, "[Als for each man being guilty before all and for all,
besides his own sins, your reasoning about that is quite correct, and it is surprising that
you could suddenly embrace this thought so fully. And indeed it is true that when people
understand this thought, the Kingdom of Heaven will come to them, no longer in a dream
but in reality"); id. at 318-19 ("Brothers, do not be afraid of men's sin, love man also in his
sin, for this likeness of God's love is the height of love on earth. Love all of God's creation,
both the whole of it and every grain of sand."); id. at 319 ("Brothers, love is a teacher, but
one must know how to acquire it, for it is difficult to acquire, it is dearly bought, by long
work over a long time, for one ought to love not for a chance moment but for all time."); id.
at 320 ("There is only one salvation for you: take yourself up, and make yourself
responsible for all the sins of men."); id. at 507 (In his epiphany dream, Mitya asks, 'Why
are these burnt-out mothers standing here, why are the people poor, why is the wee one
poor, why is the steppe bare, why don't they embrace and kiss, why don't they sing joyful
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For Dostoevsky, the whole object is to get from one pole to the other,
to recede from "everything is permitted" and not just embrace, but
actually become, "active love."347 In this process alone, confession has
a potentially salutary role and can help propel each soul from one end
of the spiritual spectrum toward the other. But, contrary to one of
Ivan's delusions, desire alone does not make it so. Rather, Dostoevsky
(and Zosima) clarifies that active love is an "experience," and that a
qualifying deed, one Grushenka calls "an onion," must requite desire. 34s
This Article began with Grushenka recalling from her childhood the
"onion" fable which is about a "wicked" woman whose "guardian angel"
tells God about her one good deed of "pull[ing] up an onion and [giving]
it to a beggar.3' 49 In the novel, other figurative "onions" materialize,
but unlike the one in Grushenka's tale, they do not become squandered
opportunities.5 0 There is the money Katerina gives to Snegiryov to
compensate him for the humiliation he endured at the hands of Mitya;
the consolation that Grushenka bestows on grieving Alyosha; and

songs.. . why don't they feed the wee one?'); id. at 591 (Mitya explains, "[Elveryone is
guilty for everyone else. For all the 'wee ones,' because there are little children and big
children. All people are 'wee ones.').
347. Id. at 56, 69; see also supra notes 345-46 (giving examples of how the two polar
opposite approaches to life are reiterated throughout the novel). Dostoevsky explains that
he "quite share[s] the ideas that [Zosima] expresses" and adds, "[11f I personally were
expressing them, on my own behalf, I would express them in a different form and a
different language," but Zosima "couldnot have expressed himself in either a language or
a spirit other than the one I gave him." Letter from Fyodor Dostoevsky to Nikolay
Lyubimov (August 7, 1879), in V LErtERS, supra note 249, at 130, 130-31.
348. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 56 ("By the experience of active love"); supra note
2 and accompanying text; infranote 349 and accompanying text (Grushenka's "onion"); see
also supra note 346 (giving examples of how the theme of active love runs throughout the
novel). Dostoevsky was especially pleased with his "onion" fable and asked Nikolay
Lyubimov "specially to do a good job of proofing the legend about the onion" and added,
"It's a gem, was written down by me from the words of a peasant woman, and, of course,
is recordedfor the first time." Letter from Fyodor Dostoevsky to Nikolay Lyubimov (Sept.
16, 1879), in V LETTERS, supra note 249, at 160, 160.
349. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 352.
350. In the "onion" fable, the woman fails the test: God gives her "that same onion,"
and if she can hold onto it and her guardian can "pull her out of the lake, she can go to
paradise, but if the onion breaks, she can stay where she is." Id. When her guardian "had
almost pulled her all the way out, .. . other sinners in the lake saw her being pulled out
and all began holding on to her so as to be pulled out with her." Id. According to
Grushenka, "[tihe woman... [as] wicked as wicked could be,... began to kick them with
her feet: 'It's me who's getting pulled out, not you; it's my onion, not yours." Id. At this
point, "the onion broke[, a]nd the woman fell back into the lake and is burning there to this
day." Id.
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pancakes and salmon to be shared by mourners at Ilyusha's memorial
dinner."5 '
Incidentally, quite a few onions are those conferred on Mitya, like the
pound of nuts, the kindness Mitya remembers his entire adult life, or the
pillow anonymously placed under his sleeping head after the dreadful
interrogation. 5 2 His dream of "the wee one," however, is the iconic
onion, which figures prominently in Mitya's rebirth. 53 In his "strange
dream," there is a "bony" woman with her breasts "all dried up, not a
drop of milk in them" and a baby in her arms "crying, crying, reaching
out its bare little arms, its little fists somehow all blue from the
cold."354 Mitya repeatedly asks, "Why are they crying?" and a peasant
replies, "The wee one."3 55 Once pressed, the peasant elaborates, "The
wee one's cold, its clothes are frozen, they don't keep it warm."35 At
this juncture, the ice begins to melt and Mitya feels a "tenderness such
as he has never known before surging up in his heart," which, in turn,
makes him yearn to give an onion:
[H]e wants to do something for them all, so that the wee one will no
longer cry, so that the blackened, dried-up mother of the wee one will
not cry either, so that there will be no more tears in anyone from that
moment on, and it must be done at once, at once, without delay
357

The dream, stirred by his genuine confession, begins to extricate him
from the idea that "everything is permitted" and inches him closer to the
Zosima "experience of active love."35' He, moreover, has an epiphany
like the one Zosima had as a child while his brother lay dying: that "we
The
are all responsible for everyone and everything."359

351.
352.
353.
354.
355.

Id. at 193-94, 350-58, 773.
Id. at 508, 674.
See id. at 507.
Id.
Id.

356. Id.
357. Id. at 508.
358. Id. at 56, 69; see also supra notes 346-47 (giving examples of how polar opposite
philosophies are reiterated throughout the novel).
359. See generally Ralph E. Matlaw, On Translating The Brothers Karmazov, in THE
BRoTHER's KARAMAZOV, supra note 115, at 671, 672 ("Since the leading idea of the novel
is that 'we are all responsible for everyone and everything,' it would not have done to
translate the word 'responsible' as 'guilty,' for that would both limit the meaning and
introduce an unwarranted legal note, perhaps also a more specifically psychiatric
connotation than Dostoevsky may have intended."); see also DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at
289 ("[Y]ou must know that verily each of us is guilty before everyone, for everyone and
everything. I do not know how to explain it to you, but I feel it so strongly that it pains
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dream-Mitya's onion-enkindles his "whole heart[, which] blazed up and
turned toward some sort of light, and he wanted to live and live, to go
on and on along some path, towards the new, beckoning light."360 But
Mitya (and Dostoevsky) knows that such a phenomenon, along with
confessional evidence, is misplaced, "incomprehensible," and "impossible"
in the mortal tribunal.6 1

me.").
360. DOSTOEVSKY, supra note 1, at 508.
361. Id. at 686; see also supra note 310 and accompanying text (describing Judge's
reaction to Ivan's confessional testimony).

